Are They Welcome?
Understanding Public Opinion on Immigrants in Southern California

September 1, 2008

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Funding for this project provided by the John Randolph Haynes and Dora Haynes Foundation

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This report would not have been possible without the contributions and assistance of many. First, we thank the John Randolph Haynes and Dora Haynes Foundation for the financial support of this project. I also thank the Ralph and Goldy Lewis Center for Regional Policy Studies at UCLA, and its director, J.R. DeShazo for supporting the Southern California Survey and also this project.

We are very grateful to Ruth Matthias for her valuable editing assistance, Linda Tran for formatting the report, and the UC AAPI Policy Multi-Campus Research Program for disseminating the report. Meiling Jin provided research assistance and Kathy Sekine helped guide us through all the paperwork.

We also thank all of those who provided assistance with survey development, including Professors Don Nakahishi, Abel Valenzuela, Roger Waldinger, and Melany De La Cruz, assistant director of the Asian American Studies Center.

Finally, the statements contained in this report and any errors herein are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the Haynes Foundation or the University of California.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF TABLES

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

- *Nationally.* Immigration has always been a part of the American experience, and the idealisim of the United States as a refuge for the "huddled masses yearning to breathe free" still holds, however tentatively. Unfortunately, ambivalence about immigrants on the part of native-born Americans has been true as well. Concern with immigration gained national attention recently, resulting in high-profile rallies in several major cities. Congress debated immigration but ultimately failed to pass a major immigration reform bill.
- *California.* While the immigration debate is a national one, the issue is particularly salient for California, as the state with the largest number of immigrants, both legal and illegal. Southern California alone is home to over 5 million foreign-born residents (U.S. Census Bureau, 2005).
- *Goals of this report:*
  --use prior studies and current data from a 2007 southern California survey
  --examine public opinion on immigration in the southern California region
  --compare it to other regions, as well as to objective data
  --analyze the determinants of attitudes toward immigration in the region

How do southern Californians feel about immigrants and policy?

- While southern Californians are concerned about immigration, overall they are more positive about immigrants today than in the past, and also more positive than Americans generally.
- Southern California residents are less restrictive and more positive on immigration policy issues than are Americans in general. In 2007, 27 percent of southern California residents felt that legal immigration should be decreased, while at the national level various polls have found that 34 - 40 percent feel it should be decreased.
- As for the economic impact of immigrants, southern California residents for the most part see immigrants as a benefit, with a majority of respondents agreeing that immigrants take unwanted jobs, especially illegal immigrants, and three quarters agreeing that legal immigrants contribute to the economy.
- There is considerable concern about the economic impact of illegal immigrants, but overall there is less animosity toward immigrants among southern Californians than among Americans in general, over half of whom believe immigrants are a burden to the country.

- Economic competition with immigrants is not necessarily a big factor in determining attitudes toward immigration.

How are anti-immigration sentiments characterized?

- Despite the relative contentment with immigration policy currently, the region has not been immune to the bouts of anti-immigrant sentiment that hit the nation and the state in the 1980s and 1990s. In both decades support for immigrants plunged for a time, before returning to previous levels.
- Support for immigrants and immigration is greater today than in previous decades, which is likely a result of the tremendous growth in the foreign born population in the region since the 1970s.
- Economic competition with immigrants is not necessarily a big factor in determining attitudes toward immigration.
- Despite general optimism, there is still great concern in the region about the cost of immigration, specifically illegal immigration.

What are the cost burdens of immigrants?

- *Health care*. While immigrants are less likely to be insured, with the exception of emergency room spending, immigrants' health costs are less than natives' health costs, both nationally and locally in the southern California region, and immigrants are generally healthier than natives.
- *Prison costs.* Immigrants in California are actually much less likely to commit crimes or become incarcerated than the native-born.
- *Education.* Although the costs of education are high ($7,477 per student), the costs of not educating immigrant children are much higher in the long run. Long-term benefits, rarely examined, include integrating immigrants into society and educating them for the labor market.
- *Overall costs.* It appears that the service costs and usage levels of immigrants are over-estimated while long term benefits of service provision, particularly education, are typically ignored.
- *Jobs.* The impact on the job market is mostly negligible, although there are winners and losers.
- *The economy*. The research fairly consistently finds that immigration does not harm the economy. It also has little effect on the wages and employment of most workers, and may in some cases actually benefit native workers.

What variables affect attitudes toward legal and illegal immigrants in the region (for three policy questions)?

Methods for analyses: Analyses are based primarily on responses to a 2007 survey of southern California residents that included a battery of questions on immigrants and immigration. This report used the survey results to test several theories about public opinion on immigration including:

- *contact with immigrants*, measured with questions as to whether the respondent has family/friends, neighbors, or co-workers who are recent immigrants, as well as whether at least one parent is foreign born.
- the *context* in which one lives, based on zip code level data, including income, education, population change, and proportion foreign born.
- *material theories*, based on economic competition, and measured with respondent's education level, degree of financial security, employment, and perceptions of immigrant costs.
- *ideological influences*, including whether a respondent is liberal or conservative, and their perception of immigrant attributes.

Findings: Only two variables are significant for all three policy questions: the *concern with costs* and *perceptions of immigrant attributes, (such as whether or not they increase crime)*; both act as predicted. Those more concerned with costs, and those who feel immigrants have a negative impact are more opposed to immigration.

- **Policy Question #1. Should legal immigration be increased, decreased, or stay the same?**
  In the case of legal immigration the factors behind attitudes of southern California residents are more consistent with the literature – education, financial security and age, all significant variables, all work as predicted. In general the material theory seems to best explain attitudes toward legal immigration.

- **Policy Question #2. Should illegal immigrants be provided a path to citizenship?**
  For illegal immigration, some results such as conservative ideology (oppose) and Latino ethnicity (favor) act as predicted. Educated respondents (some college) are more opposed than are those with less education, and those who are "conservative" are more opposed. Most interesting, while having friends and family who are recent immigrants makes one *more* likely to support a path to citizenship, having recent immigrant neighbors makes one *less* likely to support such a plan, as does living in an area with fewer foreign born residents and a higher median income.

- **Policy Question #3. Should the government do more to tighten the border?** While support for tightening the border is by no means universal, support for border control is much higher among all groups than opposition to citizenship (although clearly support for different proposals for how to control the border may also vary markedly).

Summary

Californians are more accepting. Southern California is a unique case for the study of immigration given its diversity and position as a gateway for immigrants. It appears that this experience has led to relatively more acceptance of immigrants than elsewhere, although it is also clear that the problem of illegal immigration does weigh heavily on the region. These initial results suggest that perhaps the current theories do not adequately capture these factors.

Crafting reform is a challenge. On a broader level, the results also indicate the difficulty of crafting immigration reform. Whether and how to provide a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants is politically the most difficult immigration challenge to navigate. Politicians who address the immigration issue should take note that public support for policy changes varies depending on several factors, including the specifics of the policy, and they should not take for granted that support for one policy determines support for others. A fair and balanced discussion of the costs and benefits of immigration would also be useful so policy opinions, which are heavily based on cost perceptions, can be based on objective information as opposed to inaccurate perceptions and stereotypes.

INTRODUCTION

Immigration has always been a part of the American experience, and the symbolism of the United States as a refuge for the "huddled masses yearning to breathe free" still holds, however tentatively. At the same time, native-born Americans have been ambivalent about immigrants in their midst. While concern with immigration ebbs and flows, it gained national attention recently as Congress debated immigration reform, and ultimately failed to pass a major immigration reform bill. Immigrants nationwide responded to these debates with high-profile rallies in several major cities. While the debate is a national one, the issue is particularly salient for California, as the state with the largest number of immigrants, both legal and illegal. The southern California region alone is home to over five million foreign-born residents (U.S. Census Bureau, 2005). This report examines public opinion on immigration in the southern California region, compares it with other regions, as well as to objective data, and analyzes the determinants of public opinion on immigration in the region. Although there are many conclusions to be drawn, it is clear that while southern Californians are concerned about immigration, overall they are more positive about immigrants today than in the past, and also more positive than Americans generally.

The percentage of foreign-born residents in the United States has increased almost threefold since the low period of the 1960s and 1970s. While not as high as it was at the turn of the 20th century (16 percent), the foreign-born population of the U.S. was 13 percent in 2006. In California the percentage foreign-born has also increased threefold since the 1970s, to 27 percent in 2006 (Public Policy Institute of California, 2008). California is, and has been for some time, the primary destination for immigrants entering the U.S. Between 1970 and 2006 the number of foreign-born residents in the state increased from 1.8 million to 9.9 million (ibid). In 2006 the state was also home to 2.8 million of the 11.6 million illegal immigrants living in the U.S. (Hoefer, et al. 2006). The southern California region is home to over five million foreign-born residents (U.S. Census Bureau, 2005), totaling 31 percent of the population. In Los Angeles County, the corresponding figure is 35 percent.

The current period of immigration in the United States is part of the post-1965 wave of "new" immigrants. The Hart-Cellar Act of 1965 transformed the U.S. immigration system by abolishing the old country quotas and increasing the number of immigrants admitted. New criteria for admission were established favoring family ties or needed job skills. The Act had two unintended criteria: it increased the number of immigrants arriving in the U.S. and also increased the number of immigrants from Asia and Latin America, despite targeting Eastern and Southern Europeans. As Waldinger (1997, 97) explains, "The reformers thought the new act would keep the size of the immigrant influx to modest proportions. But for various reasons the

numbers quickly spiraled: 7.3 million new immigrants arrived in the United States during the 1980s – second only to the peak of 8.8 million newcomers recorded during the first decade of the 20th century."

While many new immigrants arrived through the new legal channels, a substantial number of Mexicans and Central Americans arrived through the back door. Much of this backdoor Mexican immigration was linked to the *bracero* program. During World War II many American rural workers moved to urban areas for higher wages working in war production. The *bracero* program allowed employers to bring in agricultural workers from Mexico for temporary employment. As the American economy expanded after the war, workers continued to move from agricultural to urban areas, and the program continued, and even expanded. In the mid-1960s it was discontinued amid concern that it was getting out of control, but it was essentially replaced with a large flow of illegal workers, including many of the same workers from the *bracero* program (Muller and Espenshade, 1985). The *bracero* program essentially established the networks and connections to keep migrants coming from Latin America, not only to agricultural counties but also increasingly to urbanized counties.

The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (ICRA) attempted to close the back door amidst concern over the growing number of illegal immigrants. The three major provisions of the act included amnesty for illegal immigrants who had lived in the U.S. since 1982, an agricultural workers program, and sanctions against employers of illegal immigrants. However increased sanctions and tighter border controls did not stem the flow of undocumented immigrants. "The best estimates suggest that the total number of undocumented residents grew by over 50 percent between 1980 and 1992, even though more than three million persons had passed from illegal to legal status as a result of ICRA" (Waldinger, 1997, 100). The Department of Homeland Security estimates that 11.5 million immigrants were living in the U.S. illegally in 2006. California had an estimated 2.8 million illegal immigrants in 2006, the highest in the nation.

The urgency of immigration reform seems to ebb and flow fairly regularly in the U.S. Immigration issues were highly salient in the early and mid-1990s with the passage of NAFTA, the Haitian refugee crisis, the Cuban refugee crisis, and passage of California's Proposition 187 (Barkan, 2003). But things quieted down quickly: "Immigration then disappeared from public attention in the late 1990s, with the *New York Times* calling the 1998 mood "muted'" (ibid, 268), until the Elian Gonzalez controversy (2000), and 9/11. Then, in 2006, the U.S. Congress began deliberating immigration reform and the issue returned to prominence. Hundreds of thousands of immigrants nationwide responded with rallies in several major cities, which were widely covered by the media. The Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007 attempted

to overhaul much of the current immigration system. It provided for increased border security, established a temporary guest worker program, included provisions for reducing immigration processing backlogs, established a pilot program to allow permanent resident status for certain qualifying agricultural workers, and, most controversial, provided permanent resident status for qualifying illegal immigrants who had resided in the U.S. for at least five years and were employed for specified periods of time. This last measure was derided as another "amnesty" program by many of the bill's opponents. Ultimately, the bill died in a Senate filibuster in June 2007. The failure of the comprehensive federal bill has set off a flood of state and local immigration bills as many localities struggle to deal with an influx of immigrants.

Although both California and the southern California region are still leading destinations for immigrants, the number of new arrivals has declined recently as the immigrant population disperses across the country. However, as the region that has served as the primary immigrant gateway for the past several decades, and the region with the highest percentage of foreign-born residents, southern California provides a unique setting to examine attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. This report draws mainly on data from the 2007 Southern California Survey (SCS). The survey is a household-based random digit dialing survey of 1,502 respondents in the five-county southern California region, including Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino and Ventura counties. The 2007 Southern California Survey (SCS) described here was undertaken in the climate of the 2006-2007 congressional debates on immigration and the immigrant rallies that occurred in the same time period. The SCS asked respondents several questions about immigrants and immigration, including questions about U.S. immigration policy and the economic effect of immigrants, both legal and illegal.

The first chapter of this report presents the primary results of the SCS questions on immigration. State and national findings are also included, as well as findings from past surveys. The next chapter examines additional sources of objective data on immigrants to compare with the public's perceptions. In many cases, the public's views are quite different from what is found in the research. Finally, the third chapter provides a multivariate analysis to explain public opinion on immigration. Several theories are examined.

IMMIGRATION AND PUBLIC OPINION: The Southern California Survey

U.S. Immigration Policy

The 2007 Southern California Survey (SCS) asked four policy questions specific to current immigration policy debates:

- Whether legal immigration should be increased, decreased, or stay the same
- Whether children of undocumented immigrants should continue to qualify as American citizens if born in the U.S.
- Whether Congress should allow undocumented immigrants to stay in the country and provide a path to citizenship
- Whether the government should spend more money to tighten border security and prevent illegal immigration

The responses (along with some comparisons) are displayed in Tables 1-5. Residents are split over levels of legal immigration. One third of respondents feel immigration should be kept at its present level, while 30 percent feel it should be increased and 27 percent feel it should be decreased. As for citizenship for children of illegal immigrants, 64 percent believe they should continue to be entitled to citizenship, while 31 percent disagree. More residents are in favor of providing a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants than are opposed, as almost half of residents favor such a plan, with 31 percent strongly in favor and 16 percent somewhat in favor. About a quarter say that they strongly oppose such a plan, and 13 percent say they somewhat oppose such a plan. Some residents (13 percent) are neutral. As for tightening up the borders, 61 percent are in favor, while about a third say no.

Comparisons with National Opinion

How does these findings compare with national surveys? A *New York Times*/CBS News Poll from May 2006 and a Pew Hispanic Center Survey from February and March 2006 both asked whether legal immigration into the United States should be kept at its present level, increased, or decreased. Responses to both national polls were fairly similar, (see Figure 1), with about 34-40 percent favoring a decrease in immigration. In comparison, southern California residents do seem more willing than respondents nationally to increase, or at least not decrease, immigration levels.

Figure 1: Should Legal Immigration be Increased, Decreased, or Kept at its Present Level?



Sources: SCS 2007; NY Times/CBS 2006; and Pew 2006

The Pew poll also asked whether respondents "would favor changing the Constitution so that parents must be legal residents of the U.S. in order for their newborn child to be a citizen, or should the Constitution be left as it is?" Nationally 54 percent prefer to leave the Constitution as is, while 42 percent of respondents favor changing it (see Table 1). Although this question is slightly different from the one asked on the SCS, results suggest that on a national level the public is also more conservative on this issue than in southern California, though most still support granting citizenship to U.S. born children of illegal immigrants.

Table 1: Should U.S. born children of illegal immigrants be citizens?

	SCS 2007	Pew 2006*
Yes, entitled to citizenship	64%	54%
No, not entitled to citizenship	31%	42%
Total	95%	
Don't know/Refused	5%	

*Question wording differs, see text
Sources: SCS 2007 and Pew 2006

Finally, various questions were asked nationally about what to do with illegal immigrants. A recent *Los Angeles Times/*Bloomberg Poll from June of 2007 asked a question similar to the SCS about providing a "path to citizenship," though the question also listed requirements for this path, including "registering…, paying a fine, getting fingerprinted and learning English, among other requirements." They found that 63 percent supported such a proposal, 23 percent opposed, and 14 percent did not know. These results imply that nationally there is more

support for providing illegal immigrants with a path to citizenship (though less support than in 2006, see Table 2) than in southern California, but results from other surveys suggest that listing the requirements for citizenship makes a significant difference in the response. For example, the Pew survey (February-March 2006) asked simply "Should illegal immigrants be required to go home or should they be granted some kind of legal status that allows them to stay here?" In this case 53 percent said they should be required to go home, while 40 percent said they should be allowed to stay. The large discrepancy in responses between the two national surveys[1] could indicate that people are uncomfortable allowing illegal immigrants a path to citizenship unless there are stringent requirements to be met. This feeling may be true in southern California as well.

Table 2: Comparison of Opinions on Path to Citizenship, Allow Illegals to Stay*

	LA Times 2006	LA Times 2007	Pew 2006	SCS 2007
Support/Stay	72%	63%	40%	47%
Oppose/Deport	15%	23%	53%	37%
Don't know/Neutral	13%	14%		16%

**Question wording differs substantially, see text*
Sources: LA Times 2006 and 2007; Pew 2006; and SCS 2007

How does southern California compare with the state as a whole? The California Field Poll asked two similar questions in July 2006. The Field Poll samples only registered voters so the results are not directly comparable, but are important as policy indicators. Four in five voters (80 percent) in California favor a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants, (see Table 3), specifically "a program to allow illegal immigrants who have been living in the U.S. for a number of years an opportunity to stay in this country and apply for citizenship if they have a job, learned English and paid back taxes." A poll of all Californians in June 2007 by the Public Policy Institute of California asked whether illegal immigrants who have been in the country for at least two years should be able to keep their jobs and apply for legal status or be deported to their native country. Three quarters favored letting them stay, while 23 percent thought they should be deported (see Table 3).

Table 3: California Comparison of Opinions on Path to Citizenship, Allow Illegals to Stay

	SCS 2007	CA Field Poll 2006*	PPIC June 2007
Support/Stay	47	80	74
Oppose/Deport	37	16	23
Don't know/Neutral	16	4	3

*Registered Voters only
Source: SCS 2007; California Field Poll, July 2006 - #2205, July 27, 2006; and PPIC June 2007 www.ppic.org

[1] The *L.A. Times* poll from 2006 was done one month after the Pew poll and the differences in the response to this question were even greater, despite being administered in virtually the same time period.

While there is significant support statewide for creating a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants already here, there is also significant support for tightening the border. Over two-thirds (71 percent) of Field Poll respondents (registered voters) supported increasing the number of federal border patrol agents, while 61 percent of southern California residents also favored tightening the border (see Table 4).

Table 4: Border Control

Increase the number of federal border agents patrolling the U.S. - Mexico border			
	Favor	Oppose	No Opinion
CA July 2006*	71	26	3
Should the government spend money to tighten border security?			
	Yes	No	No Opinion
SCS 2007	61	32	7

*Registered Voters only
Source: California Field Poll, July 2006 - #2205, July 27, 2006 and SCS 2007

Demographic Group Comparisons

A breakdown of the SCS questions by income levels, ethnicity, age, and ideology indicates that opinion on immigration policy does vary by group in some cases. Younger respondents are more pro-immigrant on all of the policies. Latinos are more supportive of immigrants than other ethnic groups, and those in the lowest income category are more supportive than those in higher income categories. Those who identify themselves as liberal are more pro-immigrant on all four policy measures, while those who identify themselves as conservative are more restrictive. Moderates are somewhere in the middle. U.S.-born residents are also much more restrictive than are foreign-born residents.

The Economic Impact of Immigration

Several SCS questions asked about the economic impact of immigration on the region.

- Do you think the legal/illegal immigrants coming to this country today mostly take jobs away from American citizens, or do they mostly take jobs Americans don't want?
- Do you think that legal/illegal immigrants contribute more in state and local taxes than they use in services, or not?
- What do you think is the net effect of legal/illegal immigration on the California economy?

The responses are displayed in Figures 2-4. The majority of respondents believe that immigrants take unwanted jobs. This is particularly true for illegal immigrants, as almost two-thirds believe illegal immigrants take unwanted jobs (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: Do immigrants take jobs away from Americans, or do they take jobs Americans do not want?



Source: SCS 2007

However, a majority of respondents also believe that illegal immigrants use more in services than they contribute in taxes, while the reverse was true for legal immigrants (see Figure 3).

Figure 3: Do you think that immigrants contribute more in state and local taxes than they use in services, or not?



Source: SCS 2007

Overall most respondents (75 percent) believe that legal immigrants contribute to the southern California economy, while they are evenly split (43 percent on each side) on whether illegal immigrants contribute to or harm the economy (see Figure 4).

Figure 4: What is the net effect of immigration on the Southern California economy?



Source: SCS 2007

Comparisons with National Opinion

Nationwide respondents are more inclined than southern California residents to believe that illegal immigrants take jobs away from natives (see Figure 5). In 2006 over one-third (36 percent) of U.S. respondents believed illegal immigrants take jobs away, versus 14 percent in southern California. Only 53 percent felt that they take unwanted jobs, while 65 percent of southern California residents held that opinion.

Figure 5: Illegal immigrants take jobs away from Americans or take jobs Americans do not want?



Source: SCS 2007

As for whether immigrants are a benefit or a burden, one nationwide poll indicated that residents were evenly split, 45 percent to 45 percent on this question (NBC/*Wall Street Journal*), while another (worded slightly differently) found that only 41 percent believed immigrants strengthen this country, while 52 percent believed they are a burden (Pew). Although the questions compared here all differ slightly (the SCS did differentiate specifically between legal and illegal, which some other questions did not), which can lead to varying results, it does appear that southern California residents are more likely than respondents nationwide to feel that immigrants contribute to society. In California as a whole the majority (59 percent) believe that immigrants "are a benefit because of hard work", while 34 percent believe they are a "burden because they use public services" (see Figure 6). The results for this question have been virtually the same in three separate statewide polls over the last year (PPIC, March 2007, June 2007, and March 2008). So both California and southern California residents are more likely to see immigrants as a benefit than Americans as a whole.

Figure 6: California Residents, March 2008: Immigrants are a benefit because of hard work or burden because use public services



Source: PPIC March 2008

Demographic Group Comparisons

On economic issues Latinos are also much more supportive of immigrants than whites or other ethnic groups. Latinos are much more likely to believe that immigrants are economic contributors, particularly illegal immigrants. Breakdowns by income and education indicate that those on the lowest end of the economic spectrum are most likely to believe that immigrants contribute more in taxes than they use in services, and contribute to the overall southern California economy (see Figures 7-9).

Figure 7: Legal Immigrants - Contribute more in taxes or use more services



Source: SCS 2007

Figure 8: Illegal Immigrants - Contribute more in taxes or use more services



Source: SCS 2007

Figure 9: Illegal Immigrants - Contribute to the southern California economy



Source: SCS 2007

Results were similar for the lowest education levels. Respondents of all ages had similar opinions on the economic effects of legal immigrants, but older respondents were much more likely to believe that illegal immigrants harm the economy and use more services than were younger respondents. Ideological differences were also apparent regarding the effects of illegal immigrants on the economy, as 38 percent of liberals felt that illegal immigrants harm the economy, versus 56 percent of conservatives. The greatest differences appear between native and foreign-born respondents. Foreign-born respondents were much more likely to believe that immigrants, both legal and illegal, contribute economically. For example, over twice as

many foreign-born respondents (71 percent) believed that illegal immigrants contribute to the southern California economy as native-born respondents[2] (33 percent) (See Figure 10).

Figure 10: Illegal immigrants contribute to or harm the southern California economy



Source: SCS 2007

Past Sentiments on Immigration

How do these opinions compare with those of past surveys? Anti-immigrant sentiment ran high nationwide and in California in both the early 1980s and the early to mid 1990s. One reason for this is that public opinion on immigration is often linked to the economic climate. Lapinski et al. (1997), examining trends in public opinion on immigration, noted a significant increase in restrictive attitudes as the U.S. went into recession in the early 1980s. During the 1980s and the 1990s, respondents were much more restrictive about immigration and likely to believe that immigrants negatively affected the economic climate. This was true at both the national level and in southern California.

Although most of the comparable data is for the 1990s, a few surveys from the 1980s indicate that anti-immigrant sentiment was high nationally and in southern California. A series of Roper Polls (Simon & Lynch, 1999) indicate that nationally, the highest anti-immigrant sentiment in the U.S. was recorded in 1982, when 66 percent of respondents felt that immigration should be decreased. (The greatest level of support for immigrants was recorded in 1965 when only 33

[2] Note that the lowest income group and education group, as well as those who are foreign born, all include a large percentage of Latinos – about half of the lowest income and education groups consists of Latinos, and almost three quarters of the foreign born are Latino, consistent with our finding that Latinos are much more likely to believe that immigrants are economic contributors, particularly illegal immigrants.

percent supported decreasing immigration). As for whether immigrants take jobs away from natives or take unwanted jobs, Figure 11 indicates that southern Californians were much more likely to believe that immigrants took jobs away in the 1980s than they are today. Opinion in the region was actually more similar to national opinion in the 1980s than it is currently; the change may be partly a reflection of the high rates of immigration in the region over the past twenty-five years.

Figure 11: Comparisons over time: Whether illegal immigrants take jobs away or take unwanted jobs - U.S. and So Cal



Sources: SCS 2007; Muller and Espenshade 1983; CBS/NYT 2006; and LAT 1981

The 1990s brought another economic downturn and another jump in anti-immigrant attitudes. In a 1995 Gallup poll, 62 percent of respondents nationwide indicated that immigration should be decreased, a much larger proportion than the 44 percent recorded by Gallup at the end of the decade, in 1999. The polls referred to earlier, from 2006, show that percentage to be in the 34 - 40 percent range today (see Figure 12).

Figure 12: U.S. Respondents, percent agreeing that immigration should be decreased, 1995, 1999, 2006



Source: Gallup 1995, 1999 and NY Times/CBS 2006

Another 1995 poll found that only 32 percent of Americans agreed that immigrants contribute to the economy, while 34 percent disagreed, versus 46 percent and 25 percent respectively in 2003 (see Figure 13). In 1995 half of Americans believed that immigrants take jobs away, while only a quarter agreed with that in 2006 (Simon and Sikich, 2007; Pew Hispanic Center, 2006).

Figure 13: U.S. 1995 and 2003: Whether immigrants are generally good for the economy



Source: Simon & Sikich 2007

In the early 1990s California's anti-immigrant sentiment was prompted by an economic recession. The anti-immigrant mood culminated in the passage of Proposition 187 in 1994. The measure, also known as the "Save Our State" initiative, passed by a wide margin (59 percent to 41 percent). Proposition 187 would have denied all state services to illegal immigrants, including health care services and education, but the measure was struck down in federal court. The backlash against immigrants was considered a reaction to the long recession that hit the state in the early 1990s. Low skilled workers were hit hard as the state moved from a manufacturing base to service and high technology jobs that required higher levels of education. State and local governments were also experiencing fiscal crises (McCarthy & Vernez, 1997). However, others note that public opinion is more easily manipulated during difficult economic times, and politicians may exploit the opportunity to cast blame. Governor Pete Wilson was a strong proponent of Prop 187 during his election campaign in 1994, and in 1996 there were heated debates in Congress over cutting legal immigration and increasing penalties for illegal immigration. Jones-Correa (1998, 409) explains "Unemployment is linked only indirectly to anti-immigrant sentiment--the key variables are feelings of uncertainty and alienation, which, properly spun by opinion makers, then are used to target immigrants as symbolic scapegoats for deeper anxieties in the American republic."

The economic downturn of the early 90s also hit the southern California region hard. The defense industry was severely affected by major cutbacks in defense spending, and the housing market entered a serious slump. Anti-immigrant sentiment followed. Throughout the 1990s the Los Angeles County Social Survey (LACSS) polled Los Angeles county residents on a variety of issues, including immigration (ISSR, 1992). Some of the questions were similar enough to allow comparisons to the Los Angeles County results for the 2007 SCS. Tables 5-7 present the current SCS results for all five California counties, as well as for Los Angeles County separately and finally for Los Angeles County in 1994. Anti-immigration sentiment was significantly higher in the county in 1994, when 53 percent of respondents felt that immigration levels should be decreased, compared with 25 percent in 2007.

Table 5: Should legal immigration be increased, decreased, or kept at its present level?

	1994 LA County	2007 LA County	2007 All So. CA
Kept at present level	31%	36%	34%
Increased	13%	31%	30%
Decreased	53%	25%	27%
Don't know/No Response	3%	9%	10%

Sources: LACSS 1994 and SCS 2007

Respondents then were also more inclined to feel that U.S. born children of illegal immigrants should not be entitled to citizenship, with 35 percent agreeing with that statement in 1994 versus 25 percent in 2007.

Table 6: Should U.S. born children of illegal immigrants be citizens?

	1994 LA County	2007 LA County	2007 All So. CA
Yes, entitled to citizenship	62%	70%	64%
No, not entitled to citizenship	35%	25%	31%
Don't know/Refused	3%	5%	5%

Sources: LACSS 1994 and SCS 2007

A decade ago almost three-quarters (73 percent) supported tightening the border, while 59 percent supported doing so in 2007.

Table 7: Government should spend more to tighten borders

	1994 LA County	2007 LA County	2007 All So. CA
Yes	73%	59%	61%
No	25%	34%	32%
Don't know/No Response	2%	7%	7%

Sources: LACSS 1994 and SCS 2007

The LACSS illustrates how quickly perceptions can change. Between 1994 (the year of Prop 187) and 1998, the whole anti-immigrant mood virtually disappeared. While poll respondents continued to indicate dissatisfaction with immigration levels, the issue overall had very low priority (Barkan, 2003), and higher anti-immigrant sentiments returned to earlier lower levels. The LACSS illustrates the change in mood in Los Angeles between 1992 and 1998. While the years are not consistent across questions, it is clear that anti-immigrant sentiment increased significantly between 1992 and 1997, and then returned to 1992 levels by 1998 (see Figures 14-17).

Figure 14: Should the government spend more to deport illegal aliens (percent saying yes in LA County)



Source: LACSS 1994, 1997, 1998

Figure 15: Immigration likely to increase crime (percent saying yes in LA County)



Source: LACSS 1992, 1995

Figure 16: Should children of illegal immigrants qualify as U.S. Citizens (percent saying yes in LA County)



Source: LACSS 1994, 1997, 1998

Figure 17: Percent in LA County wanting to decrease the number of foreign immigrants, 1992-1998*



* Data from 1992, 1994, 1995, 1997, 1998
Source: LACSS

National data show the same pattern for both the 1990s and even the mid 2000s (see Figures 18 and 19). Most striking is how quickly opinion can change; in the eight month period between February 1996 and October 1996, the proportion of Americans agreeing that immigrants take jobs away dropped by 17 percentage points (see Figure 18).

Figure 18: Percent of Americans agreeing that immigrants take jobs away, 1994-1996



Source: Pew 2006

Figure 19: Percent of Americans agreeing that immigrants take jobs away, 2003 - 2006



Source: Pew 2006

However, even in a negative immigration climate, Americans often show support for immigrants themselves. Lapinski et al. (1997), in a much more thorough examination of immigration opinion trends in the 1980s and 1990s point out that Americans tend to distinguish between immigrants on a personal level and immigration in the broader sense. They note, "While the majority of Americans during the 1980s and 1990s were concerned about immigrants and wanted to keep them out, large and stable majorities also felt immigrants were hard working and honest and would be welcomed into their neighborhoods. It is striking that almost half of all Americans believe immigrants work harder than people born here" (ibid, 357).

Conclusion

While southern California residents have their concerns about immigration, particularly illegal immigration, overall they appear more positive than residents nationwide. Southern Californians are more supportive of legal immigration, and half are willing to support a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants (although these findings were difficult to compare with other surveys). Residents are also more likely than Americans as a whole to say that illegal immigrants are willing to take jobs that Americans do not want, and they acknowledge the economic contributions of legal immigrants, although they are concerned about the economic impact of illegal immigrants.

As public opinion research has consistently found, public opinion on immigration "while widely negative, is only an inch deep" (Jones-Correa, 1998, 409). Immigration sentiment swings quickly at the national and regional levels. Pollsters have recently seen these swings again in California. The SCS indicates that immigration jumped to the top of respondents' concerns in 2007, the same time that the immigration debates were in full swing in Washington and media coverage of the issue was high. However, anti-immigrant sentiment is not as high as it has been in the past, and the most recent PPIC polls indicate that increased concern with immigration in 2007 has shifted to fears about the economy and gasoline prices in 2008. How the economy in California will fare and whether immigrants will once again become scapegoats for a declining economic situation, however short lived, is yet to be determined. Public perceptions of immigrants are key factors here. The next section examines whether these perceptions are accurate.

THE COSTS OF IMMIGRATION: PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS VERSUS RESEARCH FINDINGS

Public input is critical to effective and responsive policy making, and findings from public opinion surveys can play an important role in decision-making. While knowing what people think is important, it is also useful to determine the extent to which public opinion accurately reflects the objective data on an issue. One of the main concerns about immigration is the cost to natives – the effect that immigrants have on jobs, wages, taxes, and their use of services. In southern California these concerns are more specific to illegal immigrants (see Figures 20-21); respondents are much more likely to believe that illegal immigrants harm the economy and impose fiscal costs than are legal immigrants. This section examines the more recent studies analyzing the fiscal burdens imposed by immigrants, followed by a more specific look at the cost burdens of crime, health care, and education, the three areas where the state and localities bear the brunt of the costs. Finally, the last section looks at another area where states and localities are affected – the job market – and how immigration affects jobs and wages.

Figure 20: What is the net effect of immigration on the Southern California economy?



Source: SCS 2007

Figure 21: Do you think that immigrants contribute more in state and local taxes than they use in services, or not?



Source: SCS 2007

Research on Costs

It is difficult to generalize about the fiscal impacts of immigration. Research results vary depending on, for example, which programs are examined, whether long term scenarios are included, and what level of government one examines. The service costs incurred by immigrants vary widely depending on several different factors, including age, length of time in the U.S., amount of education, and immigrant status – naturalized, legal noncitizen, undocumented, or refugee. Overall the fiscal impacts of immigration appear to be mostly negative in the short term, particularly at the state and local level, but long term effects could be positive. This section explains how some of these differences among immigrants affect their fiscal impact on the state, followed by some recent research on immigrants and service costs.

On average, immigrants tend to cost more because they work lower paying jobs, pay fewer taxes and have more children than natives. However, they generally cost no more than natives who work lower paying jobs and have a higher than average number of children. On an individual level, immigrant children and elderly immigrants are most costly to the state, while young working immigrants are less costly. Education level on arrival makes a tremendous difference in the fiscal impact of immigrants. Education levels cluster more at the extremes than do those of natives, as a distribution of all immigrants indicates that most have either a college degree or less than a ninth grade education (Fix and Passel, 1994). However, the lowest

levels of education are primarily found among undocumented immigrants and older cohorts of legal immigrants. Recent data indicates that "by 2004, all groups of legal immigrants in the country for less than 10 years are more likely to have a college degree than natives, notwithstanding the continued over-representation of legal immigrants at low levels of education" (Passell, 2005, 24). As for the cost of educating immigrant children, short-term analyses almost always ignore the long-term investment aspect of education. As immigrant children grow up and join the workforce they contribute to the economy. Older immigrants, on the other hand, retire and increase service costs.

The public also tends to be misinformed about immigrant use of services. There are strict restrictions on the eligibility for services in the U.S., and overall immigrant service use tends to be slightly less than that of natives. Service use does vary greatly by program, so the more reliable estimates average out program participation by immigrants to the extent available data allows. The legal status of immigrants determines who is eligible for public services. Legal immigrants are prohibited from applying to several programs, including SSI (Social Security), TANF (cash welfare), food stamps, and any Medicaid or Medicare benefits other than emergency care, until they have resided in the U.S. for at least five years, although naturalized citizens can access these programs immediately, as can refugees. (The 1996 welfare reform bill changed eligibility requirements for these programs, although they may vary by state). Immigrants pay into many of these programs as soon as they begin working, but are ineligible to collect until the waiting period is up. Undocumented immigrants are never eligible for any of these programs, but their U.S. born children are eligible. The major costs for undocumented immigrants are for education, emergency medical services, and prisons.

Research finds that low-income immigrants, as well as undocumented immigrant parents of citizen children, are less likely to receive means-tested public benefits than a low-income native citizen, even when they are eligible for the same benefits (National Immigration Law Center, 2006). A decade ago, a study by the National Research Council (NRC) determined that immigrant headed households are a net fiscal burden for California. They estimated that in 1994-95 these households cost the state $1,178 per capita (in 1996 dollars). These figures pre-date the 1996 welfare reform. The study also estimated a small net positive contribution for immigrants at the federal level, and estimated that if the costs of these households were nationalized they would lower to $166 – $226. The study emphasized that these were short-term estimates lacking future immigrant economic characteristics, contributions, and costs (including lifecycle changes of current immigrants), as well as possible changes in government spending and tax rates. The NRC report states that the fiscal impact of immigrants is more about their future earnings versus the earnings of natives than their participation in social welfare programs. Education is key here. They estimate that the present net value of a worker

with less than a high school education is -$13,000, while the value for one with more than a high school education is $198,000.

A 1998 analysis of welfare use by unauthorized Mexican immigrants (UMIs) in Los Angeles County found "despite experiencing conditions likely to raise the probability of needing public assistance (lower incomes, slightly higher unemployment, weaker social bonds, etc.), unauthorized Mexican immigrants residing in Los Angeles County use it at approximately the same rate or less than others" (Marcelli & Heer, 1998, 298). Their findings are based on analysis of seven means-tested entitlement programs (AFDC, GA, SSI, Medicaid, food stamps, housing, school meals). While UMIs did access some programs at greater rates than U.S. citizens, looking across all programs indicated that they did not use welfare programs at a "disproportionately higher level." And although some programs were accessed at higher rates, the actual amount received in almost all cases was much less than that received by natives or legal immigrants. However, in terms of actual incidence of welfare recipiency, naturalized citizens had the lowest rates of welfare use (16 percent), followed by UMIs (34 percent), other immigrants (37 percent), and natives (38 percent).

Overall, the research on how immigration affects demands for public services at the state and local level is somewhat mixed. A 1997 report by RAND's Center for Research on Immigration Policy found that immigrants had contributed to increased public service demands in California. However, not all immigrants are heavy service users. The greatest costs imposed at the state level were for prison, health care and education. Here is a partial look at whether immigrants impose greater costs in these areas than native citizens.

State Level Impacts on Crime, Health Care and Education

Crime

Although a large percentage of SCS respondents declined to respond to the question asking their biggest concern about immigration, among those who did respond, the greatest concern was that immigration increases crime (see Table 8), particularly that *illegal* immigration increases crime. Almost a quarter of respondents are worried that illegal immigration contributes to crime, while 11 percent are concerned that legal immigration contributes to crime. About 10 percent of respondents believe that immigration increases the danger of terrorism, so concern with crime is distinct from fear of terrorism. National survey data from

2006 (Pew, 2006) using the same question indicate that nationally very few respondents report that crime is their greatest concern about immigration[3] (see Table 8).

Table 8: What is your biggest concern about immigration? Is it that it hurts American jobs, it hurts American customs and its way of life, it increases the danger of terrorism, or that it contributes to crime?

	U.S. 2006		So Cal 2007	
	Legal	Illegal	Legal	Illegal
Economic drain/Hurts jobs	41%	31%	9%	12%
Hurts customs and way of life	17%	11%	7%	9%
Increases danger of terrorism	17%	27%	10%	11%
Contributes to crime	7%	16%	11%	23%
Some or all of the above	-	-	6%	17%
None/No response	-	-	57%	29%

Sources: Pew 2006 and SCS 2007

Yet in 2003 over a quarter of respondents nationally agreed that immigrants contribute to crime (Simon and Sikich, 2007), while crime is also the greatest concern about immigration among California respondents. Is the concern with crime warranted? Are immigrants more likely to commit crimes than the native-born? Several studies, including recent studies at the state and local level in California, and at the national level, say no.

According to The Public Policy Institute of California, immigrants in California are actually much less likely to commit crimes or become incarcerated than the native-born. The PPIC study (Butcher & Piehl, 2008) found that immigrants compose only 17 percent of the state's prison population even though they compose 35 percent of the state's adult population. U.S. born men have an incarceration rate 3.3 times higher than immigrant men, while U.S. born men 18-40 (the group most likely to commit crimes) are 10 times more likely to be institutionalized than immigrant men of the same age group. Institutionalization includes jail, halfway houses, and similar institutions. Although it is more difficult to distinguish illegal immigrants, the authors were able to focus on male non-citizens born in Mexico (the group most likely to include illegal immigrants) and found an institutionalization rate eight times lower than for U.S. born men. Immigrants also have low institutionalization rates at all education levels, and among those with the lowest levels of education – including the group most likely to have entered the U.S. illegally - institutionalization rates were very low compared with similar samples of native men. Finally, analysis of crime rates in California cities between 2000 and 2005 found that cities with

[3] Although concern in Phoenix (one of several metro areas examined separately in the survey) was much higher than nationally, indicating that areas with more immigrants may be more concerned about immigrants and crime.

a larger share of immigrants saw their crime rates fall further than cities with a smaller share of immigrants (Butcher & Piehl, 2008).

On a national level, the Immigration Policy Center reports that "data from the census and other sources show that for every ethnic group without exception, incarceration rates among young men are lowest for immigrants, even those who are the least educated" (Rumbout & Ewing, 2007, 1). They also find the incarceration rate of native men in 2000 to be much higher (4 percent) than that of foreign-born men (1 percent). The incarceration rate for men of several ethnic groups, including Hispanics, Mexicans, Salvadoran, Guatemalan, Chinese/Taiwanese, Laotians, and Cambodians was much higher for natives within each group than for the foreign-born. The higher incarceration rates for natives held true for those in each group who lacked a high school diploma as well. The authors speculate that the longer immigrants live in the U.S., the more they "become subject to economic and social forces, such as higher rates of family disintegration and drug and alcohol addiction, that increases the likelihood of criminal behavior among other natives" (ibid, 2).

Previous research at the local level also indicates no effect on crime rates. Butcher and Piehl (1998, 486) examined immigration and crime at the city level and found that "although cities with high levels of immigration tend to have high crime rates, [there is] no relationship between changes in crime and changes in immigration, measured either as year-to-year or over 10 years (1980 – 1990)." They also found that young immigrants are less likely than native-born youths to commit crimes.

While it is true that non-citizens accounted for a third of the growth in the Federal prison population between 1985 and 2000 according to the U.S. Department of Justice, two-thirds of that increase was the result of an increase in immigration offenders. After passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, referrals to the U.S. attorney's office for suspected immigration offenses increased substantially, as did the average length of prison sentences and proportion of time served. The number of federal prisoners with an immigration offense as their most serious crime increased from 1,593 in 1985, to 3,420 in 1995, and then to 13,676 in 2000 (See Figure 22). The vast majority of non-citizens in federal prison in 2000 were there either for a drug offense (54 percent) or for an immigration offense (35 percent). Only 11 percent were there for other crimes. About 20 percent of prisoners in federal custody in 2004 were non-citizens, while about 11 percent of inmates in California were non-citizens (Harrison & Beck, 2005). However federal inmates comprise only 8 percent of all prison inmates in the federal and state system.

Figure 22: Number of Federal prisoners with an immigration offense as their most serious offense, 1985 - 2000



Source: Harrison & Beck, 2005

Health Care

Health care costs are significant for the state because of an obligation to treat all people who go to the emergency room, regardless of citizenship status or whether or not they have insurance, or are able to pay. Higher rates of uninsured mean higher costs for the state. While the federal government requires states to cover emergency costs for illegal immigrants, it provides very little reimbursement for doing so, and this has a significant effect on states like California with high numbers of illegal immigrants. Counties also provide basic medical services to those without insurance or government coverage such as Medicaid. While they do receive some federal payments, these payments do not cover the full costs. Insurance coverage rates and total health care expenditures for immigrants are examined here and compared with those of natives.

Health Insurance

The Pew Hispanic Center estimates that nationally 59 percent of unauthorized migrants lacked health insurance in 2003, as did 25 percent of legal immigrants. Only 14 percent of natives lacked health insurance (Passel, 2005). The Pew estimates are based on the March 2004 Current Population Survey (CPS) with their own estimates on the number of unauthorized migrants, as the CPS lacks data on legal status. The 2007 CPS estimates the figures at 16 percent of natives not covered, 16 percent of naturalized citizens not covered, and 45 percent

of non-citizens (legal status not determined) (see Figure 23). The CPS also lists percent covered by years of U.S. residency, which shows a consistent increase in the percent insured among both naturalized and non-naturalized immigrants over a 40-year period (U.S. Census Bureau, 2007).

Figure 23: U.S. Health Insurance Rates 2007



Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 2007

The California Health Interview Survey (CHIS) data from 2005 found that 9 percent of natives, 15 percent of naturalized citizens, and 37 percent of non-citizens in the state were currently uninsured (See Figure 24). Among Latino non-citizens, 44 percent were uninsured. Also based on the CHIS data, the UCLA Center for Health Policy Research (Brown, et al., 2007) estimates that of the 4.8 million uninsured Californians in 2005, 1,038,000 were undocumented resident adults (21 percent of the total), and 136,000 were undocumented resident children (3 percent of the total). The remaining 76 percent of uninsured were citizens and other documented residents. The authors suggest that a key problem contributing to the number of uninsured is the cost of some employer-sponsored health care. "Nineteen percent of undocumented employees and 14 percent of citizen employees have access to job-based coverage through their own or a spouse's employment, but their low family incomes (at or below 250 percent of the poverty level) suggest that the required employee share of premiums may well be unaffordable" (ibid, 2).

Figure 24: California Health Insurance Rates 2005



Source: 2005 California Health Interview Survey

Health Care Expenditures

A 2005 study in the American Journal of Public Health looked at health care expenditures from the late 1990s and found that "per capita total health care expenditures of immigrants were 55 percent lower than those of U.S.-born persons ($1139 vs. $2546)" and that per capita expenditures for uninsured and publicly insured immigrants were also half those of natives. Health care expenditures for immigrant children were 74 percent lower per capita than for U.S.-born children, although emergency room expenditures were three times higher for immigrant children (Mohanty et al., 2005). The Urban Institute (2000) reported the number and cost of immigrants on Medicaid in 1994 (before Welfare Reform) and found that the total expenditures for non-citizens was $8.1 billion, or 7 percent of the total. "Insofar as non-citizens are 13 percent of the population under poverty, according to the 1996 Current Population Survey, the number of immigrants on Medicaid is less than might be expected given their poverty" (Ku & Kessler, 1997, 2). The authors also looked at expenditures by state and found that legal immigrants (eligible for full Medicaid benefits) were slightly more expensive in California (122 percent of the average vs. 90 percent nationally), while undocumented immigrants (eligible for only emergency services) cost much less than others in California (60 percent of the average cost) and much more nationally (223 percent of the average cost). They attribute these findings to greater access to Medicaid in California than in the rest of the nation.

The California Health and Human Services agency states that in 2007 California spent in excess of $941 million on emergency care for uninsured immigrants. It estimates that undocumented immigrants may account for almost $750 million annually in uncompensated health care costs. That figure is based on their proportion of the state's emergency department patients, which is 10 percent (Okie, 2007). A recent Rand Corporation study found that foreign-born adults in Los Angeles County accounted for only 33 percent of health spending in 2000, despite constituting 45 percent of the population. Undocumented immigrants (non-elderly adults) accounted for only 6 percent of spending while constituting 12 percent of the population. The study also found that native residents were more likely to use public health services than were foreign-born residents (Goldman et al., 2006). Finally, the RAND study found that foreign-born persons reported fewer health problems than natives. The undocumented were the least likely to report chronic health problems. So overall it appears that while immigrants are less likely to be insured, with the exception of emergency room spending, immigrants' health costs are less than natives' health costs, both nationally and locally in the southern California region, and immigrants are generally healthier than natives.

K-12 Education

The cost of educating immigrant children (both legal and illegal) is by far the largest public expenditure for immigrants in California. The Urban Institute (2000) estimated in 2000 that half of California's children had an immigrant parent. K-12 enrollment in the state dropped during the 1970s, but then increased tremendously during the 1980s and early 1990s, mostly fueled by new immigrants and the children of immigrants. On a national level, the number of native-born children with foreign-born parents enrolled in kindergarten through 12th grade increased by 23 percent between 2000 and 2006 (see Table 9).

Table 9: U.S. Kindergarten Through 12th-Grade Enrollment 2000-2006

	2000	2006	Change 2000-2006	Percent of 2006 K-12 enrollment	Percent change 2000-2006
Native born children					
Foreign born HH head	6,087,284	7,477,429	1,390,145	14%	23%
Native born HH head	43,356,742	42,125,064	(1,231,678)	81%	-3%
Foreign born children	2,757,898	2,666,010	(91,888)	5%	-3%

Sources: Pew Hispanic Center tabulations of 2000 Census (5% IPUMS) and 2005 American Community Survey (1% IPUMS)

The actual costs of educating the children of illegal immigrants are difficult to estimate. No government source provides estimates of the number of unauthorized K-12 children, or native-born school age children of illegal immigrants (though Passel does provide estimates of the total number of children of undocumented families). The Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) estimated 425,000 unauthorized immigrant K-12 students in California in 2004, with a total cost of $3.2 billion. They added in the cost of native-born children of unauthorized immigrants for a total cost of $7.7 billion, all based on an average cost per student of $7,577. The most recent available data on the California Ed-Data website (2006-2007) estimates the average daily attendance cost at $8,117, for a total cost of $8.2 billion, based on the same population. An estimate based on this average student cost and the percent of all Spanish language English learners in the state (21 percent of all students) yields a slightly higher figure of about $10 billion. My own estimates, following a formula used in a Government Accounting Office report from 1994, are based on Passel's (2005) estimate of 4.7 million children of undocumented families (native-born and illegal children) in 2004, increased to 2006 estimates, and adjusted for school age children, range from a low of $6.1 billion to a high of $6.9 billion[4]. (The low range assumes 74 percent of these children are actually in school, the high range assumes 86 percent. Both percentages were used in the GAO report, U.S. GAO, 1994.)

Although the costs of educating immigrants are high, the benefits are also significant. Antecol and Bedard (2004) conclude that education has a positive impact on the earnings of young Mexican immigrants, similar to the effect on non-Hispanic whites. Gonzalez finds that not only do Latino immigrant children benefit from attending school in the U.S., but the benefits of educating Mexican and Latin American immigrants outweigh the costs of twelve years of education by raising wages, reducing welfare use and increasing the tax bracket of these immigrants. Zeng and Xie (2004) find that for Asian Americans, both U.S. born children and immigrant children experience returns from education that are equal to that of U.S. born whites. This implies that the long-term cost benefit calculations are about the same. Authors of another study on the economic effect of immigrants suggest that California's future may hinge on whether there is a mismatch between the skills required in the economy, and the education and skills of immigrants and their children. If immigrants do make progress in education and occupational skills, California could benefit enormously by having a younger and more enthusiastic skilled workforce than other developed nations with aging populations and aging workforces (Center for the Continuing Study of the California Economy, 2005). And finally Fix and Passel remind us that natives often benefit directly from immigrant education

[4] I increased Passel's 2004 estimate by 10 percent per year to 2006, and multiplied by California's percentage of the undocumented population (based on Pew Center Fact Sheet, 2006), and also by the percentage school age and the percentage school age actually in school using a formula based on a 1994 GAO report, to arrive at these figures.

expenditures: "The actual recipients of these expenditures are, for the most part, native-born teachers, school administrators, maintenance staffs, and others employed in school administration, maintenance, and construction" (1994, 62).

Overall, perceptions that immigrants use more in services than they pay in taxes are not entirely accurate. While there are certainly immigration costs not covered here (population growth, increased traffic, housing overcrowding, etc.), much of the anti-immigrant rhetoric implies that immigrants, legal and illegal are coming to the U.S., using welfare-type services that are paid for by natives, and draining the system. Clearly it is not that simple. Legal immigrants do use services and illegal immigrants may access services for their citizen children, but the fact is that most immigrants are young, healthy, and able and willing to work. Legal immigrants may not apply for services for five years, and illegal immigrants are never able to use most services, with the exception of K-12 education and emergency health care. Immigrants in general are much less likely to commit crimes or become incarcerated than the native-born. And although more immigrants lack health insurance than natives, they tend to be younger, healthier, and less likely to seek medical care. Even K-12 education costs, which are significant, have long term benefits which are rarely examined, such as integrating immigrants into society and educating them for the labor market, which is the topic discussed in the next section. Any discussion of the costs of immigration should be clear about the complexity of the topic and the reason for the variations in findings.

Impacts on the Labor Market

What effects do immigrants have on jobs and wages? The most general answer is that immigrants have an overall benefit on the economy and do not affect employment or wages for most natives, but there are winners and losers. The lowest skilled workers and the most recent immigrants already here are most likely to feel any impact of new immigrants on job opportunities. Several recent studies support this conclusion.

Ong and Mar (2007) reported that immigration's effect on the labor market varies by ethnicity and race, and also length of residence. They found that recent Asian and Latino immigrants have a positive effect on employment, as they take undesirable jobs, which makes those sectors more viable, leading to a net complementary effect on natives' jobs. After a few years these immigrants may become competitors as they adjust to the labor market. Other immigrants with more skills integrate into the labor market on arrival, which causes competition, but over time have a positive effect on native workers by increasing capital and other factors. The authors estimate that the impact of immigrants on native earnings is relatively small.

A recent study by the Pew Center found that immigrants have no consistent effects on employment. The study examined data in all states during two time periods, 1990 – 2000, and 2000 – 2004, to see if higher growth in the foreign-born population was associated with "worse-than-average employment outcomes for the native-born population" (Pew Hispanic Center, 2006, i). In California, as well as in eleven other states, growth in the foreign-born population in 2000 was below average, and employment rates for native workers were below average as well. Overall, the ten states with the highest growth in the foreign-born population between 1990 and 2000 "showed significant variation in employment outcomes for native-born workers in 2000" (ibid, i), with half demonstrating better–than-average employment patterns for natives and the other half demonstrating worse-than-average employment outcomes. The pattern was the same during the 2000-2004 time period. The study also found no evidence that immigrants harm employment outcomes for young native workers with low levels of education. These workers are typically the ones most likely to compete with immigrants for jobs.

As for the effect on California more specifically, one of the most recent reports from the Public Policy Institute of California (Peri, 2007) suggests that immigration into California over the past four decades (1960 – 2004) has not affected unemployment for natives, and actually *improved* wages for native-born workers during the period 1990 - 2004. They note that the enormous flow of both documented and undocumented immigrants into the state over the past forty years has resulted in immigrants constituting one-third of the population and the labor force. Yet their analyses indicate "that immigrant workers often serve as complements to native workers rather than as their direct competitors for jobs, thereby increasing total economic output. Native workers benefit because they are able to specialize in more productive work" (ibid, 2). They calculate a four percent average real wage increase to native workers between 1990 and 2004. They also find that the only negative effects of immigration on employment are for other immigrants; recent immigrants lower the wages of previous immigrants.

The Center for the Continuing Study of the California Economy (CCSCE) finds that the major economic indicators for California improved between 1990 and 2004 despite substantial immigration. Unemployment was lower, poverty declined, average wage levels rose faster than the national average, and job growth outpaced the national average. In the 2006 update to the report they note that despite these positive indicators, the middle class has faced increasing economic insecurity in recent years, with real wages decreasing and healthcare and college tuition costs rising substantially; these factors may set some of the context for discussions about illegal immigration (CCSCE, 2005, 2-32). They also point out that it is unlikely that the state could have too many unskilled workers, as workers follow the jobs, wherever they may be. In the last ten years, immigrants have already been dispersing throughout the nation.

A report by Working Partnerships USA (Auerhan & Brownstein, 2004) looks at the effects of immigration on the local and state level, specifically on the Santa Clara County and California economies. Their major findings indicate that immigration has been economically beneficial to both areas over the past thirty years. The authors find that without immigrants and immigrant labor, taxes would be higher throughout the U.S., and many firms in the state would have been unable to sustain their growth. Immigrants made up half the increase in the size of the California labor force between 1970 and 1997. The authors state that immigration has no negative effect on wages or unemployment for U.S. born workers. As consumers, immigrants generate demand that often creates new jobs, and they often take different jobs than native-born citizens do, as their education levels tend to be at the extremes (less than high school degree or advanced degree) to a greater extent than natives. And finally, immigration creates jobs for native workers by filling positions that native workers do not, allowing firms to maintain their domestic workforce rather than automating or moving overseas.

Finally, research from previous decades supports many of these findings. A 1994 report by The Urban Institute looked at immigrant effects on jobs and wages, as well as their contribution to the economy. The impact of immigration on jobs and wages varied with the state of the local economy, but for the most part had little effect on native workers. The authors noted a one percent decline in native labor force participation when immigrant share of the labor market increased 10 to 20 percent, and cite other research which suggests that less skilled workers are slightly more affected by immigration, but through a combination of immigration and trade (Fix and Passel, 1994, 49). As for contributions to the national economy, according to the report, immigrants' share of total income was equal to their share of the population in 1989. In addition to paying tax on this income, immigrants spend much of it on goods and services, just as natives do, a point that is often overlooked in studies of immigrant contributions to the economy. Also overlooked is immigrant entrepreneurship, with almost 7 percent of immigrants self-employed in 1990, versus 7 percent of natives. These immigrants are the most economically successful, and some of them create jobs for others[5]. The report also notes the impact immigrants have in retaining U.S. jobs that would have otherwise moved overseas.

The impacts of immigration on U.S. born workers are complex, varying with the size, composition, and location of the immigrant labor force and varying with the race of U.S. born workers (see also, for example, Borjas 2006; Borjas & Aydemir, 2006; Card, 2005, 2007).

[5] For example, a 2002 study of immigrants in Chicago found that consumer expenditures of undocumented immigrants in the metro area generated 31,000 jobs in the local economy an added $5.45 billion annually to the gross regional product (Chirag, et al., 2002). Combined with high rates of participation in the workforce (the authors found that 91 percent of undocumented immigrants in Chicago seek work), immigrants do provide an economic boost in many areas.

Overall an increase in the number of immigrant workers has a negative effect on the wages of U.S. born workers, particularly on the less educated and less skilled in large metropolitan areas. However the net effects appear to be minimal, with estimates ranging from positive to negative. Moreover, the long-term effects may be positive given that with the appropriate educational opportunities, the children of immigrants add to the productivity of the economy. So why do many believe that (mostly illegal) immigrants harm the economy? Some also believe that immigrants take jobs away (12 percent of respondents offered this response, and 20 percent said "both" – they take jobs away and take unwanted jobs). If the most recently arrived low wage workers are most likely to be impacted by immigrants, they should be the ones most likely to offer these responses. The next section, based on SCS survey results, determines whether those who are concerned about the economic effects of immigration are the respondents who are most directly affected by it.

Perceived Economic Effects

If new immigrants are most likely to compete with the most recently arrived immigrants and low wageworkers, these groups should be most sensitive to immigration's affect on the economy. High-income native workers should be least sensitive to immigration. To most closely approximate these groups, this analysis examines Latino foreign-born, native low-income (less than $50,000), and native high-income ($100,000 +) respondents and how they felt about immigration's effect on the economy, whether immigrants take jobs away, and whether legal immigration levels should be changed. Foreign-born Latino respondents were actually most supportive of immigrants in each case, despite facing the most competition from new immigrants. This group was almost unanimous (93 percent) in agreeing that legal immigrants contribute to the southern California economy, versus 74 percent for native high-income respondents. Although slightly less supportive of illegal immigrants, Latinos were much more likely to feel that the undocumented contribute to the economy than were high income natives – 80 percent of Latinos felt they contribute, versus only 30 percent of high income natives, the group least likely to be affected by immigrants. Low-income natives were most concerned about immigration's effect on jobs; 23 percent felt that both legal and illegal immigrants take away jobs, versus less than 5 percent of foreign born Latinos (see Figures 25 and 26).

Figure 25: Legal Immigrants - Take jobs away or take unwanted jobs



Source: SCS 2007

Figure 26: Illegal Immigrants - take jobs away or take unwanted jobs



Source: SCS 2007

This group was also the most likely to support decreasing legal immigration: 38 percent of low-income natives want to decrease legal immigration, while only 26 percent of high income natives and 25 percent of foreign-born Latinos feel the same (see Figure 27). So perceptions of immigration are not always related to a direct economic threat.

Figure 27: Opinion on Immigration



Source: SCS 2007

Given that higher income native workers are more concerned with the economic impact of immigration, and particularly illegal immigration, than those most impacted by these groups, it is likely that their concern is not economic competition but other economic costs, such as fiscal concerns about perceived increases in service costs for this group, costs that will have to be covered by increased taxes or cuts in services, in a state perpetually facing budget crises. Clearly several factors may explain attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. The next section examines what these may be.

UNDERSTANDING ATTITUDES TOWARD IMMIGRATION IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

While previous sections of this report covered several different aspects of immigration and how public opinion varies by issues, group, and time period, this section focuses specifically on explaining attitudes on three policy questions: whether legal immigration should be increased, decreased, or stay the same; whether illegal immigrants should be provided a path to citizenship; and whether the government should do more to tighten the border. This analysis attempts to determine which factors best explain public attitudes about these three questions, and which theories best describe the formation of public opinion about legal and illegal immigration in southern California.

Tables 10 – 13 illustrate some of the distinctions in opinion between legal and illegal immigration, as well as between the two very different policy questions pertaining to illegal immigration. Table 10 indicates how restrictiveness increases as questionnaires move from asking about the desired level of legal immigration, to providing a path to citizenship to undocumented immigrants, to whether the border should be tightened. While only a quarter of respondents want to decrease legal immigration, 37 percent oppose a path to citizenship, and 61 percent want the government to tighten the border.

Table 10: Opposition to Immigration (N = 1502)

	Decrease legal immigration	Oppose path to citizenship	Tighten Border
All respondents	27%	37%	61%

Source: SCS 2007

Tables 11 and 12 presents cross tabulations of the responses to these three questions. The responses to each question differ significantly. Those who want to decrease legal immigration do not uniformly oppose providing a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants. And of those who do support a path to citizenship, almost half still prefer to tighten the border.

Table 11: Opposition to Legal Immigration by Opposition to Illegal Immigration

	Path to citizenship		Tighten Border	
Legal Immigration	Support	Oppose	Yes	No
Increase or stay the same	69%	31%	56%	44%
Decrease	45%	55%	75%	25%

Source: SCS 2007

Table 12: Opposition to Illegal Immigration

	Tighten Border	
Path to Citizenship	**No**	**Yes**
Support	54%	46%
Oppose	13%	87%

Source: SCS 2007

Table 13 illustrates a breakdown of the responses to the three questions by various demographic groups. While for most there is a continuation of the overall pattern of increasing restrictiveness from legal immigration to tightening the border, for a few groups—Latinos, foreign-born, and lower income groups - there is actually see about the same (given the margin of error) or slightly more opposition to increasing legal immigration as to providing a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants.

Table 13: Opposition to Immigration by Demographic Groups

	Decrease legal immigration	Oppose path to citizenship	Tighten border
Liberal	20%	29%	51%
Latino	24%	17%	44%
Foreign Born	24%	16%	42%
Greater than $60,000	25%	50%	72%
Whites	28%	54%	75%
U.S. Born	28%	47%	70%
Less than $60,000	29%	28%	59%
Conservative	33%	51%	75%

Source: SCS 2007

Explaining Public Opinion on Immigrants and Immigration

Several theories help explain public opinion toward immigration. These theories are loosely grouped into three categories – context versus contact, material interests, and ideology. Many of the theories overlap; for example, context includes not just the racial context one lives in, but also the socioeconomic context, which also overlaps with the economic threat theory that is categorized under material interests. For clarity, these theories are discussed separately.

Context versus contact

Many studies of attitudes toward immigration examine the influence of context, living in close proximity to immigrants, as well as the effect of direct contact with immigrants. The two theories in some ways conflict: whites in areas with a large minority population (or immigrant population) tend to hold more negative opinions of the group, yet direct contact tends to

increase positive attitudes toward minorities. However, for whites to have contact with individuals from other groups they must live in areas with a significant minority or immigrant population. Expanding the research to examine multiracial contexts and socioeconomic factors has helped to explain this contradiction.

Research on the effect of context has its roots in studies of racial attitudes in the south. Many studies confirmed Key's (1949) assertion (and related hypotheses) that the most conservative southern whites lived in areas with high concentrations of blacks (Giles and Hertz, 1994; Kinder and Mendelberg, 1995). More recent research has expanded on this idea in several different ways. For one, research now includes studies of white attitudes toward Asians and Hispanics, as opposed to focusing only on blacks. New research also explains not only how context and contact can interact, but also how larger influences may affect any particular context. For example, Hood and Morris (1997) found that whites living in areas more heavily populated with Hispanics and Asians had more positive attitudes toward these groups, supporting the contact hypothesis. However, they also found that California whites had more negative attitudes toward the two groups, suggesting that living in a state with a sizable and growing population of Hispanic and/or Asian population and not living in close proximity to them could produce more negative attitudes, supporting the group-threat hypothesis. They note that "the generally conservative preferences of Californians on the immigration issue suggest that there is a limit to the potentially liberalizing influence of the racial context" (ibid, 319). But these anti-immigrant attitudes may be an indirect effect of material concerns. Citrin and colleagues explain: "If it is true that a cognitive connection between economic distress and immigration is more readily made when there is a large foreign-born population, not only should restrictionist sentiment be more widespread in these areas, but one also should expect the influence of material concerns on opinion to be greater there than in communities where the immigrant populations are small" (Citrin, et al., 1997, 861-862). Wilson's (2001) results indicate that the minority concentration in a respondent's community has a significant effect on opposition to policies benefiting undocumented immigrants, but no effect on opposition to legal immigration.

Hood and Morris (1998) also examined the effects of a documented immigrant population in a particular area versus an undocumented population. A large legal immigrant population increases support for legal immigration among whites, whereas a large illegal population has the opposite effect. They hypothesize (as have others) that the type of contact is important, meaning that positive (or at least non-negative), meaningful contact with immigrants or a minority group is key to reducing prejudice, and this type of high-quality long-term interaction is rare among whites and undocumented immigrants. Stein et al. (2000) find that whites who live in counties with a high proportion of Hispanics and have little contact have negative evaluations of Hispanics, while whites who live in counties with a high proportion of Hispanics

and report frequent contact with Hispanics have much more positive feelings about the group. Similarly, whites with frequent contact who live in counties with a large Hispanic population are more likely to favor increasing or maintaining current levels of immigration. The results "demonstrate that contact occurs within a specific context and that context facilitates contact" (Stein et al., 2000, 299).

The literature has also expanded on the many nuances of context, incorporating socioeconomic factors with race. Branton and Jones (2005) demonstrate that context and intergroup contact explanations can rationally make sense when whites must live in a context with a minority group (which leads to negative attitudes) to actually have social contact with individuals from that group (leading to more positive attitudes). They find that affluent contexts lead to more racially tolerant attitudes, while poor socioeconomic contexts lead to more racial prejudice. So SES moderates the effects of racial composition: "the relationship between racial context and attitudes is not independent of the socioeconomic context" (ibid, 369). Finally, in another example of SES working in conjunction with race and ethnicity to affect attitudes, Gay (2006) has found that the economic status of blacks in relation other groups (specifically Latinos) has a strong influence on attitudes. Where Latinos are economically advantaged in relation to blacks, blacks are more likely to negatively stereotype Latinos and deny them the same policy benefits that they themselves enjoy. This research also points to the importance of economic resources and not simply the relative size of different racial groups in an area, as many earlier studies claimed.

Material Theories

Group threat, economic threat, and labor market competition are various theories used to explain opposition to immigration. They all fall under the heading "material theories" as they all indicate competition for resources. The basic premise for the group threat hypothesis is that the dominant groups in society have a zero sum mentality when it comes to economic resources. Dominant groups will try to restrict access to resources by subordinate groups. This can take shape as racial conflict or conflict between native-born and foreign-born. As described above, research has generally found low wage workers to be in more direct competition with immigrants over jobs while those with higher socioeconomic status feel less threatened by immigrants. Some do find disadvantaged groups to be more competitive over resources (Rodriquez, 1999; Sanchez, 1999), whereas education, income, and occupational status often lead to support for immigration (Hoskin & Mishler, 1983). Education increases chances of economic success, which lessens the threat from low wage workers such as immigrants (Citrin et al., 1997). However Federico & Sidanius, (2002) note that the highly educated do not always support racial policies such as affirmative action, which they note are one expression of group

dominance. Such divergent findings here also reflect context, as the lack of any consistent results suggests that anti-immigrant attitudes are context-dependent (Haubert & Fussell, 2006). Finally, Wilson (2001) finds the somewhat contradictory result that higher income increases opposition to both legal and illegal immigration, as does perception of an economic threat.

Perceived social costs of immigration are also a factor in anti-immigrant attitudes. These costs usually include increased taxes, competition for resources, and even labor market competition. One of the most recent studies (Fennelly & Federico, 2008) of national attitudes toward immigration finds that rural residents are more likely to support restrictive immigration policies than residents in other areas. However, the authors explain that the perceived costs of immigration are actually the strongest predictors of restrictionist views (and actually explain rural residents' views). Espenshade and Hempstead (1996) also found perceived costs, including whether immigrants take U.S. jobs, and whether they contribute or cause problems, to be a significant predictor of support for more restrictive immigration policy. Citrin et al. (1997) found similar associations, between the belief that immigrants would harm employment opportunities and affect taxes, and support for restricting immigration. Usually low wage or blue-collar service workers are most threatened by competition from immigrants. White-collar workers, on the other hand, rarely compete directly with immigrants for jobs. Some business owners and/or managers may even benefit from the cheap labor they provide (Borjas, 1998).

Additional cost concerns include tax burdens, education, welfare, and health costs. As covered in the previous section, in states such as California with high concentrations of immigrants, many of the costs associated with educating children of immigrants, legal and undocumented, as well as medical treatment for these groups who generally lack insurance, are borne locally or at the state level with little reimbursement from the federal government. Proposition 187 is a good example of native resentment and reaction to the costs of illegal immigration in California. As mentioned, Prop 187 was a 1994 ballot initiative intended to end state-funded services for all undocumented immigrants, including health care services and K-12 education. The measure passed with significant support, but was struck down in court. However, much of the current anti-immigrant rhetoric continues to focus on the cost of illegal immigration.

Ideological/Symbolic Concerns

Ideological concerns may include not only a liberal or conservative bias, which may affect one's views of immigration, both directly and indirectly, but also beliefs about multiculturalism, values, what it means to be American, and other "symbolic" political beliefs. Fennelly and Federico (2008) note that those with conservative ideologies may simply believe there are too many immigrants in the U.S., but Valenty and Sylvia (2004) explain that conservative ideology

may oppose policies like welfare or affirmative action, which in turn generates animosity towards certain groups. A conservative ideology may also emphasize law and order, which could in turn affect views of undocumented immigrants. Conservatives generally believe that taxes should be kept low, which could affect attitudes toward these groups based on the perceived costs of immigration. Neiman et al. (2006) find that Republicans are more likely to believe immigration will harm social and policy outcomes than Democrats are, but Democrats share similar concerns about the effects of immigration. They conclude that the difference between Democrats and Republicans "is one of degree but not of kind" (ibid, 45). Their data are limited to one county in southern California, however. Wilson (2001) finds "conservatism" to be correlated with opposition to immigration, but significant in a multivariate analysis only in the case of undocumented immigration.

Symbolic politics theory explains that preferences on policies with a racial component, like immigration, may be based on liberal or conservative ideologies, or even attitudes toward minorities and their impact on society and the economy (Hood and Morris, 1997; Huddy and Sears, 1990). "Symbolic politics theory emphasizes the potency of values and identities on opinion formation" (Citrin and Sides, 2007, 3). These values often override material concerns. Citrin and Sides (2007) examined opinion toward immigration in 20 European countries and found that "cultural and national identities are particularly potent" (ibid, 17) and even outweighed the role of economic interests. Still others have examined the role that values play in attitudes toward immigration policy. Pantoja (2006) determined the impact of three core American values, individualism, humanitarianism, and egalitarianism, on attitudes toward immigration policy. Egalitarianism and humanitarianism played a key role in favoring an increase in immigration. Cowan et al., (1997) examined how these same core values affected college student's views of illegal immigrants and found similar results. Participants who were less humanitarian held more negative views of illegal immigrants, as did those who stereotyped illegal immigrants more negatively.

Accordingly, in the following section, the analysis will examine the role of context and contact--where one lives and the interactions with immigrants--as well as economic threat, financial security, education, social costs, and ideological influences on attitudes toward immigration policy.

Methodology

The public opinion data come from the 2007 Southern California Survey (SCS), noted previously, and described more fully in Appendix A. There were 1,502 total respondents (numbers of those not responding to specific questions are included in the tables). Contextual data are 2006 Census estimates from Geolytics (2006), merged into the public opinion data by matching zip codes.

Dependent Variables

Three different dependent variables are used in this study. The first measures support for restricting legal immigration. "Should legal immigration into the United States be kept at its present level, increased, or decreased?" Responses were coded as 0 for increased, 1 for kept the same, and 2 for decreased. Because this dependent variable is measured on an ordinal scale it is inappropriate to use OLS regression. An ordered logit regression is run instead.

The other two dependent variables refer to policy preferences on illegal immigration: 1.) "For immigrants living in the U.S. illegally do you favor or oppose a path to citizenship?" Responses range from 1, strongly favor, to 5, strongly oppose, but were recoded to a binary variable, with 1 indicating opposition to providing a path to citizenship, and 0 indicating a neutral or supportive stance. 2.) "Should the government spend more money to tighten border security and prevent illegal immigration?" Responses are coded 0 for no, and 1 for yes (see Tables 3.5 and 3.6 for variable descriptions and statistics). Binary logit regressions are run for both of these dependent variables.

Independent Variables

The independent variables operationalize the theories reviewed in the literature. The variables that measure material or economic threat include employment, financial security, education, and social cost[6]. Employment is coded simply as yes (1) or no (0). Financial security, based on the response to the question "how economically secure do you feel at the present time?" is coded from 1, very insecure, to 4, very secure. Education is also measured on a scale, from 1, less than high school, to 6, degree higher than bachelor's. Social cost, another form of material threat, is measured with a score based on responses about the cost of immigrants, including whether they think legal (and illegal, in separate questions) immigrants 1.) mostly take jobs

[6] Although the survey did inquire about the respondent's income level, the large non-response rate (600) to this question forced us to drop this variable from the analysis.

away from Americans, 2.) use more in services than they contribute in taxes, and 3.) contribute to or harm the economy. Scores range from 0 (low cost) to 6 (high cost) with a mean of 1.67.

Ideological beliefs are measured with two variables. Two variables for conservative and liberal (0=no; 1=yes) capture political ideology. A scale for immigrant trait attribution was also created, combining two questions about immigrants and immigration. 1.) "What is your biggest concern about legal immigration?" (the same question was also asked for illegal immigration), and 2.) "What do you think is the best thing about being a nation of immigrants?" The scale ranges from 0-4, with higher scores indicating anti-immigrant attitudes.

The contextual variables are all based on the respondent's zip code, and include median income; the proportion of residents born in the U.S., recoded as a dummy variable for high, medium, or low; the proportion with high education; and the population change in the area between 2000 and 2006. Contact indicates direct contact with immigrants. There are three variables, based on whether the respondent has friends or relatives who are recent immigrants, whether recent immigrants live in the neighborhood, and whether they are co-workers. Another variable indicates whether one or both of a respondent's parents are born in the U.S or not (1 = one or both parents U.S.-born).[7]

Finally, gender (1= male; 0=female) and age (in years) were included as demographic variables that have been shown to affect attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. A variable for Latino is used to measure the effect of ethnicity (1 = Latino).

[7] I should note that a dummy variable for nativity was included to test the effect of a respondent being an immigrant, but results were not significant, and because of the correlation with Latino (which was significant) a decision was made to drop the nativity variable.

Table 14: Variable Descriptions

	Description
Dependent Variables	
Legal Immigration	Should legal immigration into the United States be kept at its present level, increased, or decreased? 0 = increased, 1 = kept the same, 2 = decreased
Path to citizenship	Thinking about immigrants who are living in the U.S. illegally, do you favor or oppose the following: Congress should allow them to stay and provide them with a path to citizenship.
	0 = favor or neutral, 1 = oppose
Tighten border	Should the government spend more money to tighten border security and prevent illegal immigration? 0 = No, 1 = Yes
Independent Variables	
Employed	0 = No, 1 = Yes
Economic Security	All in all, how economically secure do you feel at the present time? Coded 1: very insecure to 4: very secure
Parents US Born	0 = No, 1 = one or both parents U.S. born
Some College	0 = No, 1 = Yes (excluded group is no college)
College Degree	0 = No, 1 = Yes (excluded group is no college)
Liberals	0 = No, 1 = Yes
Conservatives	0 = No, 1 = Yes
Contact with Immigrants Score	*Scale creation questions: (higher score - more contact)*
	Do you have any friends or relatives who are recent immigrants?
	How many recent immigrants live in your neighborhood?
	How many recent immigrants do you work with as co-workers?
Immigrant Cost *(Legal and Illegal Scales)*	*Scale creation questions: (higher score = more concern about costs)*
	Do you think the legal (illegal) immigrants coming to this country today mostly take jobs away from American citizens, or do they mostly take jobs Americans don't want?
	Do you think that legal (illegal) immigrants contribute more in state and local taxes than they use in services, or not?

	Description
	What do you think is the net effect of legal (illegal) immigration on the southern California economy? (1 = contribute significantly, 5 = significantly harm the economy)
Immigrant Attribute* *(Legal and Illegal Scales)*	*Scale creation questions: (higher score = more negative attitude toward immigrants)*
	What is your biggest concern about legal (illegal) immigration? Is it that it hurts American jobs, it hurts American customs or way of life, it increases the danger of terrorism, or that it contributes to crime?
	What do you think is the best thing about being a nation of immigrants? It helps the American economy, provides cultural diversity, immigrants strengthen the country with hard work and talents, or something else?
Zip code level variables	
Median Income	Median household income 2006
Proportion Born U.S	Proportion of population born in US (2006)
Low Foreign Born	1 = live in zip code with low proportion of foreign born residents; 0 = does not live area with low proportion of foreign born residents. (medium foreign born is excluded category) (low = proportion US born greater than or equal to 95)
High Foreign Born	1 = live in zip code with high proportion of foreign born residents; 0 = does not live area with high proportion of foreign born residents (medium foreign born is excluded category) (high = proportion born US less than or equal to 69)
Population Change 2000-2006	Population change (percent) 2000 - 2006
Proportion High Education	Proportion of population with above average education (2006)
Demographics	
Age	Respondent's age measured in years
Male Gender	0 = No, 1 = Yes
Latino	0 = No, 1 = Yes

* Because respondents answered these questions in various ways, assigning scores based on whether the response attributed several negative or positive traits, one, or none, for each question was not possible.

** All "proportion" variables are measured on a 1-1000 scale, with 100 equal to the national average.

Source: 2007 SCS and 2006 Census estimates from Geolytics (zip code level variables)

Table 15: Descriptive Statistics

Variables	Mean	S.D.
Dependent Variables		
Legal Immigration	0.968	0.750
Path to citizen	0.373	0.484
Tighten border	0.613	0.487
Independent Variables		
Employed		0.476
Economic Security	2.800	0.853
Parents US Born	0.599	0.490
Some College	0.272	0.445
College Degree	0.327	0.469
Liberals	0.242	0.429
Conservatives	0.287	0.452
Contact with Immigrants Score	1.560	0.937
Immigrant Cost	1.666	1.362
Immigrant Attribute	1.178	0.622
Immigrant Cost2 (illegal)	2.930	1.860
Immigrant Attribute2 (illegal)	1.400	0.490
Median Income Zip Code	49,625	18,463
Proportion Born U.S Zip Code	81.048	16.319
Pop Change 2000-2006 Zip Code	11.068	10.797
Proportion High Education Zip Code	94.464	60.743
Age	49.035	16.025
Male Gender	0.449	
Latino	0.360	

Sources: SCS 2007 and Census 2006 estimates from Geolytics

Hypotheses

Four general hypotheses related to the theories described are tested. Material, or economic threat theory suggests that direct economic competition from immigrants increases the likelihood that a respondent will be more restrictive on immigration policy. Employed residents should be less threatened by immigrant labor, as should respondents who feel financially secure, so both should be more supportive of immigration, legal and illegal. Higher education levels also minimize the threat posed by low wage workers, which should translate into more pro-immigrant attitudes. However a high score on the immigrant cost scale indicates the respondent believes there are high social costs associated with both legal and illegal immigration and this should increase anti-immigrant sentiment for both.

As for ideology, conservatives should be more restrictive while liberals should be more supportive of immigration and illegal immigrants. A higher score on the immigrant trait attribution scale, which assigns more points to respondents who see few or no benefits to immigration and identify several concerns about immigration, should also indicate a more restrictive attitude toward immigration. Frequent contact with immigrant family, friends, neighbors, or co-workers on the other hand should lead to more supportive attitudes toward legal and illegal immigrants.

As noted, the effect of racial context on racial attitudes and attitudes toward immigrants has been well documented in the literature, and more recently the effect of one's socioeconomic environment on racial attitudes, or attitudes toward the "out-group" has been tested as well. A higher concentration of immigrants in one's neighborhood (defined here as zip code) should increase anti-immigrant sentiment. However the education level of one's neighborhood may mitigate these effects somewhat. A higher proportion of educated residents in one's zip code should lower anti-immigrant feeling, as should a higher median income (consistent with the material hypotheses). Population change in the zip code to see if areas with a significant increase in population are likely to increase anti-immigrant sentiment is also included. Rapid population growth often leads to problems such as crime, crowding, traffic, and growth issues, which may be easily blamed on an "out-group" such as immigrants.

Finally, the demographic variables: older residents have been shown to be more restrictive in their attitudes toward immigration, as have females, although results for demographic variables (age, gender, and ethnicity) have been somewhat inconsistent in the literature (Chandler & Tsai, 2001; Citrin et al., 1997; Wilson, 2001). Barkan's (2003) research on attitudes toward immigration in California found that Latinos were generally less concerned about both legal and illegal immigration, but did indicate more concern than others about illegal immigrants taking

away jobs. In southern California particularly, Latinos often have ties to the immigrant community or are immigrants themselves (only 44 percent of Latino respondents in this survey were born in the U.S.). While a cultural affinity type theory would predict a higher level of support for immigration from Latinos, they may also be worried about competing with newer immigrants for jobs.

Results

The first set of regression models (Model 1) tests how well the theories explain attitudes toward legal immigration without the contextual variables, while the second set of models (Model 2) includes the contextual, zip-code derived variables.

Legal immigration

The initial regression results, based on Model 1, indicate support for three out of the four theories. The effect of the material hypothesis is supported by several significant variables, all in the hypothesized direction. Respondents who are economically insecure are more anti-immigrant than those who are not, although employment has no effect. Those with a college degree are more supportive of immigration than those with lower levels of education. Those who are concerned with the cost of immigration are also more restrictive.

As for the ideological variables, the immigrant attribute scale is significant, indicating that respondents with negative views of immigrants and immigration are more restrictive than others. (Conservatives are more restrictive, as predicted, though the variable was not statistically significant). None of the contact variables (parents born in the U.S. or immigrant contact) were significant, but of the two demographic variables, age was significant, indicating older respondents are more restrictive than younger respondents. Gender and Latino ethnicity had no effect.

In Model 2, the contextual variables were added but results are similar (college degree is no longer significant). None of the contextual variables are statistically significant below the .10 level. Overall, the Nagelkerke pseudo-R-square for this model was .13, not a significant difference from the initial model at .126. This means that for Model 2, 13 percent of the variance in attitudes toward legal immigration are accounted for by the independent variables.

Table 16: Regression Results: Ordered Logit Regression

Should LEGAL immigration levels into the U.S. be increased, stay the same, or decreased *(Higher values indicate a more restrictive attitude)*						
	Model 1			**Model 2**		
MATERIAL/ECON THREAT	***Estimate***	***S.E***	***p-value***	***Estimate***	***S.E***	**p-value**
Immigrant Cost	0.287	0.050	***	0.288	0.046	***
Employed	0.154	0.130		0.138	0.135	
Financial Security	-0.138	0.065		-0.166	0.067	**
Some College	0.070	0.140		0.062	0.142	
College Degree	-0.303	0.140	**	-0.278	0.148	
IDEOLOGICAL/ATTITUDE						
Immigrant Attribute	0.414	0.090	***	0.381	0.094	***
Liberal	-0.187	0.130		-0.176	0.135	
Conservative	0.259	0.130	**	0.241	0.129	
CONTACT						
Parents Born in U.S.	0.120	0.140		0.127	0.144	
Immigrant Friends/Family	-0.029	0.120		-0.036	0.124	
Immigrant Neighbors	0.062	0.140		0.040	0.137	
Immigrant Coworkers	-0.033	0.120		-0.051	0.122	
CONTEXT (Zip code based)						
Median Income*				.0754	0.046	
High Foreign Born				-0.143	0.142	
Low Foreign Born				-0.193	0.136	
Population Change				-0.009	0.006	
Proportion High Education				-0.003	0.001	
DEMOGRAPHIC						
Age	0.011	0.000	***	0.011	0.004	
Male	-0.046	0.110		-0.047	0.113	
Latino	0.067	0.140		0.043	0.148	
Dependent Variable = 0	.332	.372		.084	.425	
Dependent Variable = 1	2.353	.378		2.116	.430	***
Pseudo R squared	0.126			0.130		
N	1259			1259		

* multiplied by 10,000

** P < .05

*** P < .01

Source: SCS 2007

Illegal immigration

Two different dependent variables were used to measure public opinion toward illegal immigration. Opposition to providing a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants is first examined. In Model 1, without the contextual variables, results provide some support for each of the theories. Respondents who are more concerned with the cost of illegal immigration are more opposed to providing a path to citizenship, as hypothesized. In Model 1, "some college" is positive and significant, indicating that educated respondents are more opposed to providing a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants than are those with the least education, contrary to the material hypothesis. Although the sign for "college degree" is also positive (indicating more opposition to a path to citizenship) the result is not statistically significant. Employment and economic security were not significant. As for ideology, the immigrant attribute variable was significant, indicating that those with more negative perceptions of illegal immigrants are less likely to support a path to citizenship, as are conservatives, as hypothesized (the liberal variable was negative, but not statistically significant). The immigrant contact hypothesis also finds some support here, as those who have one or both parents born in the U.S. are more opposed to a path to citizenship than those whose parents are immigrants, and those who report having friends or family who are recent immigrants are more supportive of providing a path to citizenship. Neither age nor gender was significant, but the variable for Latino was significant, confirming that Latinos are more supportive of providing a path to citizenship than others, as indicated in Table 13.

The second model for opposition to a path to citizenship incorporates the contextual variables. In Model 2, many of the same variables were statistically significant as in the Model 1 (and not significantly changed in terms of effect size), but contextual effects are also significant. Notably, the immigrant contact variables changed here. While having friends or family that are recent immigrants is still key, having a parent born in the U.S. is not. However, having neighbors who are recent immigrants makes one more likely to *oppose* a path to citizenship, which is the opposite effect from what was expected. As for the contextual variables, the median income for the zip code was positive and significant, indicating that respondents in higher incomes areas are more likely to oppose a path to citizenship. A respondent in an area with a low proportion of foreign-born residents is also more opposed to a path to citizenship. Both results are contrary to the literature that finds that a greater proportion of minorities or immigrants usually leads to negative attitudes toward the group, and that higher SES areas are more accepting of "out groups". The pseudo R-squared improved from .459 in the initial model to .472 with the addition of the contextual variables, a small but significant increase (confirmed by an F-test).

Table 17: Regression Results: Logit Regression

Thinking about immigrants who are living in the U.S. ILLEGALLY, do you favor or oppose the following: Congress should allow them to stay and provide them with a path to citizenship. (0 = Yes, 1 = No)						
	Model 1			**Model 2**		
MATERIAL/ECON THREAT	***Estimate***	***S.E***	**p-value**	***Estimate***	***S.E***	**p-value**
Immigrant Cost	0.621	0.051	***	0.625	0.052	***
Employed	-0.022	0.179		-0.060	0.184	
Financial Security	-0.037	0.088		-0.086	0.091	
Some College	0.476	0.192	**	0.452	0.197	**
College Degree	0.330	0.194		0.310	0.204	
IDEOLOGICAL/ATTITUDE						
Immigrant Attribute	0.909	0.197	***	0.910	0.201	***
Liberal	-0.136	0.183		-0.140	0.188	
Conservative	0.580	0.172	***	0.454	0.177	***
CONTACT						
Parents Born in U.S.	0.502	0.189	***	0.336	0.197	
Immigrant Friends/Family	-0.433	0.170	**	0.448	0.174	***
Immigrant Neighbors	0.344	0.183		0.387	0.190	**
Immigrant Coworkers	-0.011	0.163		0.033	0.167	
CONTEXT (Zip code based)						
Median Income*				0.160	0.063	**
High Foreign Born				0.064	0.200	
Low Foreign Born				0.415	0.180	**
Population Change				0.013	0.007	
Proportion High Education				-0.004	0.002	
DEMOGRAPHIC						
Age	0.002	0.005		0.002	0.010	
Male	0.150	0.150		0.188	0.160	
Latino	-0.466	0.197	**	-0.507	0.210	**
Pseudo R squared	0.459			0.472		
N	1259			1259		

* multiplied by 10,000

** P < .05

*** P < .01

Source: SCS 2007

The third dependent variable is whether or not the government should tighten the border. The results for the Model 1 are similar to the results for the path to citizenship model. Again, respondents in the middle level of education are more likely to support tightening the border than those with lower -- or higher -- education levels. Those concerned with the cost of illegal immigration and conservatives are also more likely to support tightening the border. Notably, there is no evidence that contact with immigrants has any effect on attitudes toward tightening the border (although having a parent born in the U.S., or friend/family member who is a recent immigrant did have an impact on attitudes toward a path to citizenship). Two of the demographic variables are significant; males are more likely to support tightening the border, and Latinos less likely.

No differences appear in Model 2. Contextual influences are lacking, as none of the variables had any significant effect. The pseudo R-square for the first model was .336, for the second, .338.

Table 18: Regression Results: Logit Regression

Should the government spend more money to tighten border security and prevent illegal immigration? (0 = No, 1= Yes)						
	Model 1			**Model 2**		
MATERIAL/ECON THREAT	***Estimate***	***S.E***	***p-value***	***Estimate***	***S.E***	***p-value***
Immigrant Cost	0.442	0.046	***	0.431	0.047	***
Employed	-0.003	0.169		-0.075	0.172	
Financial Security	0.090	0.083		0.087	0.085	
Some College	0.422	0.179	**	0.415	0.183	**
College Degree	0.220	0.180		0.161	0.188	
IDEOLOGICAL/ATTITUDE						
Immigrant Attribute	0.740	0.163		0.780	0.166	***
Liberal	-0.247	0.163		-0.241	0.166	
Conservative	0.679	0.171	***	0.702	0.175	***
CONTACT						
Parents Born in U.S.	0.013	0.171		0.010	0.177	
Immigrant Friends/Family	-0.249	0.154		-0.244	0.155	
Immigrant Neighbors	0.224	0.172		0.262	0.176	
Immigrant Coworkers	-0.087	0.156		-0.077	0.158	
CONTEXT (Zip-code based)						
Median Income*				0.006	0.060	
High Foreign Born				-0.157	0.178	
Low Foreign Born				0.092	0.181	
Population Change				-0.007	0.007	
Proportion High Education				0.002	0.668	
DEMOGRAPHIC						
Age	0.001	0.005		0.001	0.005	
Male	0.338	0.143	**	0.331	0.146	
Latino	-0.469	0.180	***	-0.367	0.188	
Pseudo R squared	0.336			0.338		
N	1259			1259		

* multiplied by 10,000

** P < .05

*** P < .01

Source: SCS 2007

Discussion

The results provide some support for each of the theories, but a surprisingly limited role for contextual factors. In addition, the level of support for each of the theories differs in each of the models as different factors come into play depending on the policy in question. No one theory fits all, although one's perceptions of the cost of immigration and the attributes of immigrants themselves have the greatest effect on attitudes toward immigration policies.

For the material theories, the cost of immigration was a significant factor driving anti-immigrant attitudes in all of the models, and particularly in the attitudes toward illegal immigration. Financial security was a factor in support of legal immigration but not illegal immigration. Education played a role as well, and cost factors could also account for why those with mid-level education are most opposed to illegal immigration. It is likely that educated respondents, including those with some college, are more aware of the societal costs of immigration, which affects their views, but those who lack a college degree also feel more threatened by competition from immigrants (particularly in southern California) than the more highly educated, leading to their more restrictive attitudes.

For the ideological theories, scores on the immigrant attribute scale strongly predicted policy positions, both legal and illegal. For every unit of increase on the immigrant attribute scale (increasingly negative view of immigrants) a respondent is 21 percent more likely to oppose a path to citizenship, and 19 percent more likely to support tightening the border. Conservative ideology was also a strong predictor of opposition to a path to citizenship and support for tightening the border; in fact, conservatives are 19 percent more likely to favor tightening the border than are non-conservatives.

As for the demographic variables, age was a significant predictor for attitudes toward legal immigration, with older respondents proving more restrictive, as predicted. Males are more likely to favor tightening the border. Latinos are less restrictive than others in their attitudes toward providing a path to citizenship and tightening the border, but not statistically different from others in their attitudes toward legal immigration. As Latinos make up the vast majority of foreign-born respondents in this survey, an additional analysis was run to separate the effects of Latino ethnicity versus nativity. Controlling for other factors among Latinos only, foreign-born Latinos are more likely to favor increasing legal immigration, while native-born Latinos favor keeping it the same. However no other statistically significant results were found when comparing foreign-born with native-born Latinos.

Two variables that measure direct contact with recent immigrants yield interesting results, though only in the case of a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants. When controlling for contextual factors, having friends or family who are recent immigrants makes one more supportive of providing a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants, while having immigrant neighbors makes one less likely to support such an initiative. Having immigrant parents also makes one more supportive of providing a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants, although the variable was not significant once the contextual variables were added. These results suggest that perhaps neighbors provide a very different experience for contact than do friends and family. Recent immigrant neighbors may be viewed more in terms of an "outgroup" encroaching, as opposed to providing for meaningful interaction with immigrants. This outcome supports Hood and Morris' (1997) assertion that the *type* of contact one has with immigrants or minorities is key. Unless one considers a neighbor to be a friend, the type of contact may not be direct and meaningful enough to engender positive feelings about the group.

Support for the contextual theories was found only in the case of opposition to a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants. Respondents in higher income zip codes are more opposed to providing a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants, as are respondents in areas with fewer foreign-born residents. For each increase of $10,000 in area median income the probability of opposing a path to citizenship increases by 4 percent. Respondents in areas with low percentages of foreign-born residents are 10 percent more likely than those in areas with more immigrants to oppose a path to citizenship. Both of these results are contrary to much of the literature that finds that being surrounded by an "out-group" leads to more negative attitudes toward these groups, as does living in an area with a lower socioeconomic status. However they may support Hood and Morris' (1997) conclusion that the typical findings regarding context do not always hold in California because of the substantial immigrant population. A Pew study (2006) also found that native-born Americans who live in areas with few foreign-born residents are less likely to see immigration as a local problem, but they are more likely to see immigrants "as a burden to the nation and as a threat to American customs" (Pew Hispanic Center, 2006, 5) than are those who live in areas with high concentrations of immigrants.[8] The income finding is also somewhat consistent with Wilson (2001) who found that those with higher incomes increased opposition to legal and illegal immigration, although Wilson measured income on an individual level, not a contextual level. Awareness of the societal cost of immigration (population pressures, growth, service costs, etc.) would be the most likely explanation for these results, but since awareness of these costs were controlled, the result is difficult to explain.

[8] Bivariate results only, not controlling for other factors.

Given both the diversity and the size of the immigrant population in California, it is likely that the effects of context are more difficult to isolate. It is possible that using a different contextual unit could have changed the results. A smaller unit such as a precinct level or census block level may more appropriately capture interactions at the neighborhood level. Others suggest that economic competition between groups is more appropriately measured at the county level. However the high level of diversity in southern California means that residents are exposed to different groups to a much greater degree than elsewhere in many aspects of everyday life, from their neighborhoods to the evening news. Additional research could determine how to accurately measure the influence of context in the southern California region.

As for comparing explanations for attitudes toward legal versus illegal immigration, other than "immigrant cost" and "immigrant attribute", no other factor explains all three policy positions. In general the material theory seems to best explain attitudes toward legal immigration, while ideology and Latino ethnicity most consistently explain attitudes toward illegal immigration. Although there are similar factors that determine attitudes toward providing a path to citizenship and tightening the border, the key differences are that those with parents born in the U.S., and those living in areas with fewer immigrants and higher median incomes are more likely to oppose a path to citizenship than others, while these factors have no effect on attitudes toward tightening the border. This result indicates that both personal contact and proximity to immigrants does make a difference in determining how to deal with undocumented immigrants already here, although it is difficult to explain this particular result, given that it contradicts much of the previous literature. Again, the results may be specific to southern California and its unique experience with immigration.

Conclusion

So, are immigrants welcome in southern California? In 2007, immigrants seem more welcomed in southern California than nationwide. Survey results suggest that legal immigrants are welcome here, and are generally appreciated for their contributions to society. Illegal immigrants on the other hand, are less welcome. More specifically it seems that those already here are grudgingly acknowledged for taking jobs that others will not, working hard, and becoming part of life in the region, but they are also resented for the substantial societal costs attributed to them, deservedly or not. While residents seem cautiously willing to integrate illegal immigrants already here into society (perhaps more so given stringent requirements to meet), they are also supportive of closing the border to stem the future flow of these immigrants. A look at the past reminds us that these attitudes can change rapidly, however; the 1980s and 1990s remind us that the region can quickly jump on an anti-immigrant bandwagon in bad economic times. These moods are fairly short-lived however, and attitudes

today seem more accepting of immigrants than they did in the past. Indeed, the high percentage of foreign-born residents in southern California today likely accounts for this change.

One thing that is clear from the data analysis is that perceptions of immigrant costs are germane to attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. The second section of the report illustrated how some of these cost perceptions may not be accurate. While immigrants do impose costs on society, and the region, including costs that are less attributable to specific groups, such as population growth, traffic, and overcrowded and expensive housing, many estimates of direct government costs have indicated that on average, immigrants use services to a lesser extent than natives do, although this does vary by program. As for effects on jobs, few studies find significant negative effects and some find benefits to native workers. Immigrants create jobs as well, as entrepreneurs, and as consumers of goods and services. Any debate on immigration reform should strive to be as accurate as possible in outlining the costs and benefits of immigration (and the factors that make these difficult to estimate consistently) so the public can be informed and decisions can be made based on data, not rhetoric and stereotypes.

Of course, attitudes – toward immigration or any other issue – are not based solely on facts. While the perceived costs of immigration are key in each of the analyses, they are not the whole story. Ideology is important, as is education, although not always predictably. Those with some college are the most restrictive on illegal immigration, in contrast to much of the literature. Latinos are less restrictive than others on illegal immigration, but no different on legal immigration, indicating perhaps a cultural affinity factor. Contact and context were not as significant as hypothesized, but bear results worth examining further, as attitudes in such a populous and diverse region are examined.

Although southern California is a unique case given its diversity and its position as a gateway for immigration, these findings can somewhat be generalized, especially since some of the results were consistent with the literature. Perhaps more importantly, what is currently known about the attitudes of southern Californians toward immigration policy will prove useful in the future as the dispersion of immigrants throughout the nation continues. An important conclusion here is that the most difficult immigration challenge to navigate politically will be whether and how to provide a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants. While support for tightening the border is by no means universal, support for border control is much higher among all groups than opposition to citizenship (although clearly, support for different proposals for how to control the border may also vary markedly). Politicians who address the immigration issue should take note that public support for policy changes will vary depending

on several factors, including the specifics of the policy; they should not take for granted that support for one policy will determine support for others. A fair and balanced discussion of the costs and benefits of immigration would also be useful, so that policy opinions, which are heavily based on cost perceptions, can be based on objective information as opposed to inaccurate perceptions and stereotypes.

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APPENDIX A: SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY, 2007

The 2007 Southern California Public Opinion Survey was supported by the UCLA Ralph and Goldy Lewis Center for Regional Policy Studies and was designed to gather the views and opinions of Southern California residents on critical public policy issues in this region. The survey was developed with input from campus partners, including Professors Don Nakahishi, Abel Valenzuela, Roger Waldinger, and Melany De La Cruz, assistant director of the Asian American Studies Center.

The 2007 Survey gathered basic demographic data and covered four topical areas: 1) major issues facing the region, 2) the efficacy of local government, 3) immigration 4) neighborhoods. When possible, questions were worded to parallel existing questions from other surveys.

The Social Science Research Center (SSRC) at California State University, Fullerton conducted the telephone survey of individuals age 18 years and older residing in 1,502 randomly selected households in five Southern California Counties; Los Angeles, Orange, San Bernardino, Riverside, and Ventura. The survey was conducted between February 6 and May 9, 2007. Data were collected in English and Spanish with 1,236 (82.3%) interviews completed in English, and 266 (17.7%) in Spanish. Interviews were conducted between 8:00 am and 9:00 pm local time Monday through Thursday, and between 11:00 am and 7:00 pm local time Saturday and Sunday. The SSRC's estimated response rate for this telephone survey was 56.52%.

The sample is divided proportionally by county household population. The characteristics of the sample by age, ethnicity, income, education and nativity are roughly consistent with the 2005 American Community Survey, though SCS respondents do tend to be slightly older. There is a sampling error of +/- 2.5 percent at the 95 percent confidence level for the full sample. (Sampling error may be larger for subpopulations).

For more results from this and previous southern California surveys go to:
http://lewis.sppsr.ucla.edu/special/SocalSurvey/index.cfm

APPENDIX B: 2007 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA SURVEY - Lewis Center, UCLA

SHELLO Hello, my name is _____and I'm calling from the Social Science Research Center at Cal State University, Fullerton. Have I reached [READ RESPONDENT'S TELEPHONE NUMBER]?

SINTRO I am calling on behalf of The Lewis Center for Regional Policy Studies at UCLA. This is a scientific study of public opinion on regional issues such as local government, immigration, and neighborhood involvement. This survey takes less than fifteen minutes to complete. Your identity and your responses will remain completely anonymous and confidential, and of course, you are free to decline to answer any survey question.

SHEAD Are you the head of this household or his or her spouse or partner or another member of the household?

1.	HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD	[SKIPTO INTRO]
2.	SPOUSE/PARTNER	[SKIPTO INTRO]
3.	OTHER	[CONTINUE]

SHEAD2 Is the head of the household or his or her spouse or partner at home?

1.	YES	[SKIPTO INTRO]
2.	NO	

CALLBAK1 Can you please tell me when to call back to reach the head of the household or his or her spouse or partner?

INTRO I wonder if we might ask you some survey questions for this study that I think you might find interesting. This survey takes less than fifteen minutes to complete. Your household was selected through a random digit dialing process. Your identity and your responses will remain completely anonymous and confidential, and of course, you are free to decline to answer any survey question. Participation is purely voluntary.

We believe that this survey is needed to accurately describe the views of Southern California residents. Your opinions count, and your participation would be very useful. I should also mention that this call may be monitored by my supervisor for quality control purposes only. If you have any questions about the research or your rights as a survey respondent I can provide contact information for the university authorities who will answer your questions. *(Please see **Fallback Statements** for further information)*..

[SEE FALLBACK STATEMENTS FOR FURTHER INFORMATION].

Is it all right to ask you these questions now?

1.	YES	[SKIPTO TRANS1]
2.	NO	[CONTINUE]

APPT Can you suggest a more convenient time to ask you the survey questions? [SCHEDULE CALLBACK]

SOCAL Which county do live in?

1.	LOS ANGELES	[SKIP TO IF18]
2.	ORANGE	[SKIP TO IF18]
3	RIVERSIDE	[SKIP TO IF18]
4.	SAN BERNARDINO	[SKIP TO IF18]
5.	VENTURA	[SKIP TO IF18]
6.	ALL OTHER COUNTIES	[CONTINUE]
7.	DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE	
9.	REFUSED	

NOTARES We are studying only residents of particular Southern California counties at this time. Thanks very much for taking the call, however. We appreciate your patience with our procedures. Good bye.

IF18 May I verify that you are 18 years of age or older?

1. YES [SKIPTO TRANS1]
2. NO
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

NOT18 I'm sorry, but our survey procedures require respondents to be 18 years of age or older. Thank you for your time.
PRESS '1' TO END CALL.

TRANS1 ***I'll begin by asking you a few questions about issues facing Southern California***.

Q1a. What do you think are the three most important problems facing Southern California today?

1. FIRST PROBLEM (SPECIFY)
2. SECOND PROBLEM (SPECIFY)
3. THIRD PROBLEM (SPECIFY)
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q1b. What do you think is the most important problem facing your own family today?

1. (SPECIFY)
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q2. What are the three best things about living in Southern California?

1. FIRST (SPECIFY)
2. SECOND (SPECIFY)
3. THIRD (SPECIFY)
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q3. Thinking about the overall quality of life in Southern California, as far as you are concerned, how do you feel that things are going? Would you say very badly, somewhat badly, somewhat well or very well?

1. VERY BADLY
2. SOMEWHAT BADLY
3. SOMEWHAT WELL
4. VERY WELL
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q4. Thinking about the quality of life in Southern California *in the next 12 months*, as far as you are concerned, do you feel that things will improve, stay the same, or get worse?

1. WILL GET WORSE
2. WILL STAY THE SAME
3. WILL IMPROVE
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q5. How much confidence do you personally have in your local government at the present time? Would you say...

1. NOT MUCH CONFIDENCE,
2. SOME CONFIDENCE, OR
3. A LOT OF CONFIDENCE?
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q6. How much confidence do you have in your local government to solve the problems that most affect your own household or family? Would you say...

1. NOT MUCH CONFIDENCE,
2. SOME CONFIDENCE, OR
3. A LOT OF CONFIDENCE?
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q7 For the following issue areas, please tell me whether the performance of Southern California's elected officials has been generally inadequate, mixed, or generally adequate:
[RANDOMIZE PRESENTATION]

a. Keeping and attracting business investment in the region?
b. Keeping and attracting jobs?
c. Providing affordable housing in the region?
d. Improving transportation in the region?
e. Protecting the environment in the region?
f. Improving education in the region?
g. Preparing for and responding to a possible terrorist attack in the region?
h. Providing police protection?

1. GENERALLY INADEQUATE
2. MIXED
3. GENERALLY ADEQUATE
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q8. How much confidence do you personally have in the federal government at the present time? Would you say...

1. NOT MUCH CONFIDENCE,
2. SOME CONFIDENCE, OR
3. A LOT OF CONFIDENCE?
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

[Rotate Q8 AND Q9]

Q9. How much confidence do you personally have in your state government at the present time? Would you say...

1. NOT MUCH CONFIDENCE,
2. SOME CONFIDENCE, OR
3. A LOT OF CONFIDENCE?
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q10a. All in all, how economically secure do you feel at the present time – very insecure, somewhat insecure, somewhat secure, or very secure?

1. VERY INSECURE
2. SOMEWHAT INSECURE
3. SOMEWHAT SECURE [SKIP TO Q9]
4. VERY SECURE [SKIP TO Q9]
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q10b. Why do you feel insecure?

1. (SPECIFY)
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q11. Which of the following best describes your current employment situation? Are you…

1. EMPLOYED
2. SELF EMPLOYED
3. ACTIVELY LOOKING FOR WORK
4. TEMPORARILY ON LEAVE FROM WORK
5. NOT WORKING OR LOOKING FOR WORK
6. NONE OF THE ABOVE
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

IMMIGRATION QUESTIONS

TRANS – ***We're going to change the topic now and ask some questions about immigration***.

Q12. Do you think that most of the people who have moved to the United States in the last few years are here legally, or are most of them here illegally?

1. LEGALLY
2. ILLEGALLY
3. HALF AND HALF
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q13. Do you have any friends or relatives who are recent immigrants?

1. YES
2. NO
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q14. How many recent immigrants would you say live in your neighborhood?
*(**Note**: if they ask for a definition, the neighborhood is the surrounding area that is within a reasonable walking distance from their home)*

1. MANY
2. SOME
3. ONLY A FEW
4. NONE
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q15. How many recent immigrants do you work with as co-workers?

1. MANY
2. SOME
3. ONLY A FEW
4. NONE
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q.16 Should LEGAL immigration into the United States be kept at its present level, increased, or decreased?

1. KEPT AT PRESENT LEVEL
2. INCREASED
3. DECREASED
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q.17 If the U.S. continues to allow significant numbers of immigrants, from which area of the world should we encourage more immigration?

1. (SPECIFY)_____
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q18. The Constitution states that anyone born in the U.S. is automatically a U.S. citizen. Should the children of illegal immigrants continue to qualify as American citizens if born in the U.S., or not?

1. YES, CONTINUE TO BE ENTITLED TO CITIZENSHIP
2. NO, SHOULD NOT BE ENTITLED TO CITIZENSHIP
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q19. Thinking about immigrants who are living in the U.S. ILLEGALLY, do you favor or oppose the following: Congress should allow them to stay and provide them with a path to citizenship.

1. STRONGLY FAVOR
2. SOMEWHAT FAVOR
3. NEUTRAL
4. SOMEWHAT OPPOSE
5. STRONGLY OPPOSE
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q20. Do you think the LEGAL immigrants coming to this country today mostly take jobs away from American citizens, or do they mostly take jobs Americans don't want?

1. TAKE JOBS AWAY
2. TAKE UNWANTED JOBS
3. BOTH
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q21. Do you think the ILLEGAL immigrants coming to this country today mostly take jobs away from American citizens, or do they mostly take jobs Americans don't want?

1. TAKE JOBS AWAY
2. TAKE UNWANTED JOBS

3. BOTH
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q22. Do you think that LEGAL immigrants contribute more in state and local taxes than they use in services, or not?

1. Contribute more in taxes
2. Use more services
3. Both about equally
4. Don't know
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q23. Do you think that ILLEGAL immigrants contribute more in state and local taxes than they use in services, or not?

1. CONTRIBUTE MORE IN TAXES
2. USE MORE SERVICES
3. BOTH ABOUT EQUALLY
4. DON'T KNOW
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q24. Should the government spend more money to tighten border security and prevent illegal immigration?

1. YES
2 NO.
3. DON'T KNOW
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q25. What is your biggest concern about LEGAL immigration? Is it that it hurts American jobs, it hurts American customs and its way of life, it increases the danger of terrorism, or that it contributes to crime? (choose one)

1. HURTS JOBS
2. HURTS CUSTOMS AND WAY OF LIFE
3. INCREASES DANGER OF TERRORISM

4. CONTRIBUTES TO CRIME
5. OTHER (SPECIFY)_____
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q26. What is your biggest concern about ILLEGAL immigration? Is it that it hurts American jobs, it hurts American customs and its way of life, it increases the danger of terrorism, or that it contributes to crime? (choose one)

1. HURTS JOBS
2. HURTS CUSTOMS AND WAY OF LIFE
3. INCREASES DANGER OF TERRORISM
4. CONTRIBUTES TO CRIME
5. OTHER (SPECIFY)_____
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q27. What do you think is the best thing about being a nation of immigrants? It helps the American economy, provides cultural diversity, immigrants strengthen the country with hard work and talents or something else?

1. HELPS ECONOMY
2. PROVIDES CULTURAL DIVERSITY
3. IMMIGRANTS PROVIDE HARD WORK AND TALENTS
4. OTHER (SPECIFY) _____
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q28. What do you think is the net effect of LEGAL immigration on the Southern California economy?

1. IMMIGRANTS CONTRIBUTE SIGNIFICANTLY
2. IMMIGRANTS CONTRIBUTE MODERATELY
3. NO EFFECT
4. IMMIGRANTS MODERATELY HARM THE ECONOMY
5. IMMIGRANTS SIGNIFICANTLY HARM THE ECONOMY
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q29. What do you think is the net effect of ILLEGAL immigration on the Southern California economy?

1. IMMIGRANTS CONTRIBUTE SIGNIFICANTLY
2. IMMIGRANTS CONTRIBUTE MODERATELY
3. NO EFFECT
4. IMMIGRANTS MODERATELY HARM THE ECONOMY
5. IMMIGRANTS SIGNIFICANTLY HARM THE ECONOMY
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

NEIGHBORHOOD QUESTIONS

TRANS – ***Now we're going to change topics again and ask you some questions about your neighborhood***.

Thinking of your neighborhood as the surrounding area that is within a reasonable walking distance from your home, please tell me:

Q30. What would you say are the 3 best things about your neighborhood?

1. FIRST (SPECIFY)
2. SECOND (SPECIFY)
3. THIRD (SPECIFY)
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q31. What would you say are the 3 worst things about your neighborhood?

1. FIRST PROBLEM (SPECIFY)
2. SECOND PROBLEM (SPECIFY)
3. THIRD PROBLEM (SPECIFY)
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q32. Do you grocery shop and/or go out to eat in your neighborhood?

1. MOST OF THE TIME
2. SOME OF THE TIME
3. VERY LITTLE
4. NEVER
5. NO PLACE TO EAT OR SHOP
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q33. Do you have family and/or close friends in your neighborhood?

1. YES
2. NO
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q34. If you have school age (K-12) children, do they go to school in your neighborhood?

1. YES
2. NO
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q35. When was the last time you spoke with one of your neighbors for more than 5 min?

1. WITHIN THE LAST TWO DAYS
2. WITHIN THE LAST WEEK
3. WITHIN THE LAST MONTH
4. DON'T TALK TO NEIGHBORS
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q36. How would you describe this neighbor?

1. RELATIVE
2. A CLOSE FRIEND
3. FRIENDLY, BUT NOT CLOSE
4. AN ACQUAINTANCE ONLY

5. OTHER _____
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q37. About how often do you and people in your neighborhood do favors for each other, such as watching each other's children, borrowing items, help with shopping, etc?

1. OFTEN
2. SOMETIMES
3. RARELY
4. NEVER
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q38. Would you say that most people in your neighborhood can be trusted, or not?

1. MOST NEIGHBORS CAN BE TRUSTED
2. CANT' BE TOO CAREFUL
3. OTHER/DEPENDS
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q39. How many times in the past twelve months did you attend a neighborhood-wide meeting or event? (SPECIFY) _____

TRANS – ***We're almost done, we just have a few more questions on some other topics***…

[Contact Local Officials/Donate/Volunteer]

Q40. How many times in the past twelve months have you contacted an elected official by phone, mail or email? _____

Q41. In the past twelve months have you donated money or volunteered for any charitable organization?

1. DONATED MONEY
2. VOLUNTEERED TIME
3. BOTH

7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q42. Has your household made any changes in response to the recent rise in energy prices, in order to conserve energy or gasoline, and keep costs down?

1. YES (SPECIFY) _____
2. NO
7. DON'T KNOW/NO RESPONSE
8. NO RESPONSE

Q43. How likely do you think it is that there will be at least one act of terrorism in Southern California in the next two years? Would you say that an act of terrorism is...

1. Not at all likely,
2. Not too likely
3. Somewhat likely, or
4. Very likely?
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q44. If there is a terrorist attack in Southern California in the next two years where do you think it will take place?

1. AIRPORT
2. PORTS
3. NUCLEAR LAB/REACTOR SITE
4. DOWNTOWN LOS ANGELES
5. MAJOR TOURIST DESTINATION/ENTERTAINMENT OR SPORTING VENUE
6. SUBWAY OR RAIL SYSTEM
7. LARGE SHOPPING CENTER
8. OTHER (SPECIFY)
77. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
99. REFUSED

TRANSD ***These last few questions are for classification purposes only. All of your answers will remain anonymous and will be combined with those of other survey participants for reporting as averages.***

Q45. Do you own or rent your home?

1. OWN
2. RENT
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q46. In what year were you born?

1. 19___
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q47. What was the last grade in school that you completed?

1. LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMA/GED
2. HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMA/GED
3. SOME COLLEGE, NO DEGREE
4. ASSOCIATE DEGREE
5. BACHELOR'S DEGREE
6. A DEGREE HIGHER THAN A BACHELOR'S (I.E. MASTERS, PH.D.)
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q48. In which country were you born?

1. UNITED STATES [SKIP TO Q39]
2. MEXICO
3. VIETNAM
4. INDIA
5. OTHER (SPECIFY)
7 DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q49. Are you a naturalized citizen of the United States?

1. YES
2. NO
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q50. Were one, both or none of your parents born in the U.S.?

1. ONE
2. BOTH
3. NONE
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q51. How do you describe your race or ethnicity?

1. ASIAN (SPECIFY)
2. BLACK OR AFRICAN-AMERICAN
3. CAUCASIAN OR WHITE
4. OTHER, INCLUDING MORE THAN ONE RACE: (SPECIFY)
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q52. Are you of Hispanic/Latino origin?

1. YES
2. NO
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q53. How many adults 18 or older are in your household?

1. NUMBER OF ADULTS _____
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q54. How many children under 18 are in your household?

1. NUMBER OF CHILDERN _____
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q55. Which of the following categories best describes your total household or family income before taxes, from all sources?

1. UNDER $20,000
2. $20,000 TO $29,999
3. $30,000 TO $39,999
4. $40,000 TO $49,999
5. $50,000 TO $59,999
6. $60,000 TO $69,999
7. $70,000 TO $79,999
8. $80,000 TO $89,999
9. $90,000 TO $99,999
10. $100,000 TO $124,999
11. $125,000 TO $149,999
12. $150,000 TO $174,999
13. OVER $175,000
77. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
99. REFUSED

Q56. Which of the following best describes your political ideology?

1. VERY LIBERAL
2. LIBERAL
3. MODERATE
4. CONSERVATIVE
5. VERY CONSERVATIVE
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q57. May I confirm that your zip code is [READ ZIP CODE]?

1. YES [SKIP TO Q52]
2. NO
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q58. For sampling purposes only, may I have your correct zip code?

1. ZIP CODE _____
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q59. Would you be willing to participate in a follow-up interview some time in the future?

1. YES
2. NO [SKIP TO CONCLUD]
7. DON'T KNOW/ NO RESPONSE
9. REFUSED

Q60. Your telephone number will be provided to UCLA researchers for a follow-up telephone interview that will last approximately 15 minutes. Do you prefer to be called at the telephone number I used to reach you today, or should the researchers contact you at a different number?

1. USE SAMPLE NUMBER [TELEPHONE NUMBER]
2. USE ANOTHER NUMBER (SPECIFY)

TRANS3. Once again, I assure you that your telephone number and responses to this survey will remain completely confidential.

CONCLUD Thank you. That concludes the Southern California Survey. Your participation is deeply appreciated.

[INTERVIEWER: CODE GENDER, LANGUAGE OF INTERVIEW, AND LEVEL OF COOPERATION]